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HOT CRIMES: A STUDY IN EXCESS 
STEVEN GROSSMANt 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods 
of moral panic. . . . [IJts nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades 
are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-
thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more 
often) restored to; ... sometimes the panic passes over and is 
forgotten . .. at other times it has more serious and long-last-
ing repercussions and might produce such as those in legal 
and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
33 
In the fall of 1984, after a jury acquitted two parents she had ac-
cused of sexually molesting their children and before she was forced to 
drop charges against the twenty-one remaining defendants she had 
accused of child sex abuse related charges, the chief prosecutor in Jor-
dan, Minnesota said that she was "sick to death of things like the pre-
sumption of innocence."2 After the tragic mass murders at Columbine 
High School in 1999, Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") is-
sued a press release classifying the "murders as 'insignificant' com-
pared to those killed in alcohol-related traffic accidents."3 
What do these two announcements have in common? This Article 
suggests that each is but one manifestation of the pathology that ex-
ists regarding certain crimes and the reaction to them on the part of 
the public, the media, legislative bodies, law enforcement authorities, 
and ultimately members ofthe judicial system. For a long time, crimes 
such as these were either not treated with the seriousness they de-
serve (i.e. drunk driving) or the extent of their prevalence in society 
was significantly underestimated (i.e. child sex abuse). Fortunately, in 
ways this Article discusses, the previous undervaluation or under ap-
t The author, a former New York City prosecutor, is the Dean Julius Isaacson 
Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. He wishes to thank 
Chris Trumpower and especially Justin Fine and Ashley Marucci for their thoroughness 
and dedication to this project. 
1. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF MODS AND 
ROCKERS 9 (MacGibbon & Kee eds. 1972). 
2. Civia Tamarkin, Kathleen Morris, PEOPLE, Dec. 24, 1984, http://www.people. 
com/people!articleJO,,20089593,OO.html. 
3. David J. Hanson, Mothers Against Drunk Driving: A Crash Course in MADD, 
ALCOHOL ABUSE PREVENTION, http://alcoholfacts.org/CrashCourseOnMADD.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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preciation of these crimes was brought to the attention of different 
elements of American society, and people were educated about the na-
ture of these crimes and the degree of harm they cause. AB a result of 
this heightened attention, the public and particularly victims' rights 
groups began to call for more action in preventing and punishing these 
crimes. Legislatures on both the state and federal levels responded to 
these calls with new laws designed to accomplish both goals. Prosecu-
tors investigated these crimes with more urgency and charged and 
prosecuted them more strictly. Judges began to sentence individuals 
convicted of these offenses more harshly. In other words, each affected 
group in society took action in an appropriate way to deal with the 
dangers that child sex abusers and drunk drivers posed. 
There came a point, however, when reaction turned into over-re-
action and remedial measures became excessive. This Article exam-
ines some of that over-reaction, seeks to explain why it occurs with 
certain crimes, fleshes out the lessons to be learned from the over-
reactions, and offers suggestions on how to avoid recurrences of this 
type of social pathology. For the most part, this Article uses those 
crimes related to the serious problems that child sex abusers and 
drunk drivers pose as illustrations of how crimes become hot crimes 
and then how such crimes are treated. 
Section II of this Article discusses the genesis of a hot crime, what 
factors appear to be needed for a crime to become hot, and how each 
factor contributes to the way in which such crimes are ultimately 
treated. Section III looks at the types of excesses that hot crimes 
breed. Section IV examines the kind of flaws in society's responses to 
hot crimes that breed these excesses. Section V discusses how the con-
cept that has been referred to as moral panic explains the hot crimes 
phenomenon. Lastly, Section VI explores ways in which society, par-
ticularly law enforcement and legal institutions, can respond to seri-
ous crimes without the need to react with excessive and arguably 
unconstitutional measures. 
II. THE GENESIS OF HOT CRIMES 
On October 23, 1976, a man who was thrown out of a Bronx, New 
York social club after having an argument with his girlfriend returned 
to the club and threw a firebomb into the club. The result was an ar-
son fire that killed twenty-five people.4 One year later on October 12, 
1977, during the television broadcast of the second game of the World 
4. Joe Conason & Jack Newfield, Arson for Hire: The Men Who are Burning New 
York, VILLAGE VorCE, June 2, 1980, at 15-19; Gulliver's Discotheque Fire, New York, 
HAVOC BUILDING CONTROL FIRE SAFETY, http://www.iklimnet.com/hotelfireslclubfire 
case7.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
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Series from Yankee Stadium, a fire started in an abandoned public 
school building a few blocks away from the stadium. The fire obviously 
made for dramatic television, as the camera from an ABC helicopter 
lingered on the view of the school burning. Legendary sports broad-
caster Howard Cosell, who was announcing the game for ABC Sports, 
looked at the fire and said, "There it is, ladies and gentlemen, the 
Bronx is burning."5 
Prior to the game and Cosell's words, the Bronx had been suffer-
ing from a rash of arson fires, especially in decaying areas of this New 
York City borough.6 While some were acts of deliberate violence like 
the social club fire, the vast majority were believed to be either ran-
domly set or the product of attempts by landlords to get damage 
awards from insurance companies for what were becoming worthless 
properties. 7 Cosell's comment was an example of the growing atten-
tion that the media was paying to the arsons and the reactions to 
them. 
The legal community was reacting to the escalating arson fires as 
well. State legislatures in the region passed laws making the arson 
fires far more serious crimes.s Perhaps more significantly, politicians, 
prosecutors, and judges, especially those in the Bronx, handled arson 
fires, even ones in which no one was hurt, far differently than they 
had in the past.9 Crimes such as rape, armed robbery, and even some 
homicides, long viewed as among the most serious of crimes, became 
secondary to arson. Arson quickly received the most attention and the 
heaviest sentences. In other words, arson had become a hot crime.10 
Although in 1970's New York the number of arson fires seemed to 
increase, there was nothing new about fires being set for deliberate 
reasons. The amount of attention arson fires received during this time 
period had to do with more than just an increase in the frequency of 
such crimes. Where no injuries resulted from fires, arson had always 
5. 1977 World Series, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference. 
com/bullpen/1977 _World_Series (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
6. Leslie Maitland, Arson Destroying New York Housing at a Record Rate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1980, at AI. 
7. Conason & Newfield, supra note 4, at 15-19. 
8. See Robert E. Tomasson, Drive to Combat Arson in State Reported Gaining, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1981, at 11. 
9. See Maitland, supra note 6, at Al (quoting then-New York City Mayor Edward 
Koch as saying, "Those who commit arson are the most despicable people in the world, 
and if apprehended should be sent away for forever."); see also Howard Blum, Arson in 
New York: The Landlords and Their "Torches," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1980, at AI; 
Conason & Newfield, supra note 4; Leslie Maitland, Suspicious Fires Found to Have 
Patterns in City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1980, at AI. 
10. For instance, the New York Times did a three-part expose on the rash of New 
York City fires. See Maitland, supra note 6, at AI; Blum, supra note 9, at AI; Maitland, 
supra note 9, at AI. 
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been viewed, prosecuted, and punished as a property crime. In the 
1970s, the media, the public, legislators, prosecutors, and judges be-
gan to understand that arson fires, even where no injuries resulted, 
should be viewed as much more than just crimes against property.ll 
The crime of arson, until the late 1970s, was not treated with the seri-
ousness it deserved. The 1980's equivalent of arson, in this regard, 
was the crime of drunk driving. 
A. DRUNK DRIVING 
"[B]ooze had to go when ... the motor car came in." 
- Henry Ford.12 
America has always been fascinated with the automobile. 13 Cars 
provide a relatively fast way to get from place to place and give us the 
freedom of movement on which we have come to depend. When Europe 
was relying on vast rail systems and other means of public transporta-
tion after World War II, America was constructing the Eisenhower In-
terstate System. Many believe that modern America has inadequate 
means of public transportation to satisfy our needs, but our system of 
roads and highways is considered extensive and relatively complete. 
The primary problem with our roadways is that over-reliance on auto-
mobiles in the United States creates congestion.14 
In the 1960s and 70s, the United States experienced an alarming 
increase in the rate of driving-related fatalities, and understandably 
people became concerned about the dangerous driving that caused 
these accidents.15 While it was no secret at that time that a significant 
number of these accidents were caused by drivers who had been drink-
ing alcohol, the drunk driving laws were enforced in a manner that 
was lax, inconsistent, and unresponsive.16 
Several reasons for this lack of effective enforcement of the drunk 
driving laws existed. First, it was difficult to fully understand the 
problem because both effective field research is difficult to conduct 
and research into drunk driving did not begin in earnest until after 
the drunk driving problem was "federalized."17 Second, the law en-
forcement community did not consider drunk driving a "real crime." 
For example, until the 1990s, the FBI did not even include drunk driv-
ing related crimes in the national crime database.18 Lastly, drunk 
11. See Conason & Newfield, supra note 4. 




16. [d. at xv, xvi. 
17. [d. at xix, xx. 
18. [d. at xx. 
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driving may simply not conform to social, historical, or political expec-
tations of a crime in the way murder, theft, or terrorism might. 19 
In 1910, New York became the first jurisdiction in the United 
States to adopt laws against drunk driving.2o Early laws prohibited 
driving while intoxicated, but the necessary proof of intoxication was 
hard to come by because chemical tests for blood alcohol content 
("BAC") were not yet invented.21 Once BAC tests were created, and 
law enforcement was required to use them, the American Medical As-
sociation recommended, and early laws adopted a BAC standard: The 
law presumed that drivers with a .15% BAC or higher were under the 
influence, drivers with less than .05% were not, and drivers with a 
BAC in between could be found to be under the influence if corroborat-
ing circumstances were present.22 
In many ways, the BAC23 standard is arbitrary24: a BAC of .10% 
is the level where "approximately half of the population will show 
signs of intoxication."25 While a .04% BAC is "not inconsistent with 
safe driving," the likelihood of a vehicle accident increases dramati-
cally at .08%.26 Although arbitrary, the BAC standard is objective, 
and anti-drunk-driving advocacy groups soon began pressuring 
lawmakers to set a lower BAC standard for intoxicated driving.27 
In the 1960s, fueled by several court decisions and the writings of 
doctors and other experts, alcoholism came to be regarded as more of a 
disease than a crime.28 Alcoholics are people who either physically or 
psychologically cannot resist drinking liquor. To imprison such people 
19. [d. at xxi. 
20. [d. at xiv. 
21. H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVERS: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING 
LIVES 42-43 (1992). 
22. [d. at 43. 
23. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 70 ("BAC, measured in terms of the weight of the 
quantity of alcohol in a given volume of blood, expresses the ratio of weight to volume 
(or breath), in terms of a percentage."). 
24. [d. at 70-71. 
25. [d. at 71 (referencing a 1970 American Medical Association Committee on 
Medicolegal Problems study). 
26. [d. at 71 (referencing Professor Borkenstein's classic Grand Rapids Study). 
27. See Craig Reinarman, The Social Construction of an Alcohol Problem: The Case 
Against Mothers Against Drunk Drivers and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY & 
SOC'y 91, 98-99, 105-{)6 (1988). 
28. See Public Health Service Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-574, 82 Stat. 
105; Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); see also ELVIN JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPI' OF ALCOHOL-
ISM (1960). In his book, Jellinek 
described alcoholics as individuals with tolerance, withdrawal symptoms, and 
either "loss of control" or "inability to abstain" from alcohol. He asserted that 
these individuals could not drink in moderation, and, with continued drinking, 
the disease was progressive and life-threatening. Jellinek also recognized that 
some features of the disease (e.g., inability to abstain and loss of control) were 
shaped by cultural factors. 
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was regarded as cruel and unhelpful. During the five years from 1969 
to 1974, the number of arrests for public drunkenness in the United 
States fell from two million to one million.29 This huge decrease was 
both a cause of and a reaction to the lenient treatment alcohol-related 
crimes received in the courts. In many states, drunk driving was only 
a hybrid crime. That is, the crime was viewed as a combination of 
being drunk and driving recklessly. 30 
Furthermore, judges were not trained in how to deal with drunk 
drivers. There was no line to guide them with respect to when mere 
carelessness became harmful behavior. Judges, therefore, were left 
largely to their own devices in deciding how to treat alcohol related 
driving crimes.31 It was inevitable then that the subjective views that 
judges had towards drunk drivers would playa significant, even de-
terminative role, in how driving related alcohol crimes were sen-
tenced. Such subjective views were, no doubt, formed in large part by 
each sentencing judge's unique experiences and values. 
Given the socioeconomic group from which they come, most state 
judges are considerably more likely to sympathize and even empathize 
with a drunk driver than they are with most other types of 
criminals.32 This was especially true before the 1980s and 90s when 
drunk driving became a hot crime. A judge might know a burglar, an 
armed robber, or a rapist outside his or her professional life, but the 
chances are not great. It is even less likely that the judge ever commit-
ted the crime himself. It is very likely, however, that the judge knew 
people who perhaps had a drink or two too many during a dinner 
meeting or a holiday celebration and then drove home.33 It would not 
stretch the imagination too far to believe that perhaps the judge had 
done so him or herself.34 Judges are more likely to empathize with 
Thomas R. Hobbs, Ph.D., Managing Alcoholism as a Disease, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, 
Feb. 1998, http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/298wp.html; see also Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (referring to drug addiction, often compared to alco-
holism, as an illness). 
29. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 12; see also David Robertson Jr., Powell v. Texas: The 
Case orthe Intoxicated Shoeshine Man Some Reflections a Generation Later by a Partici-
pant, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401, 441 (1999) (quoting the 1967 President's Crime Commis-
sion Report as stating, "[In] 1965 there were two million public drunkenness arrests in 
America, for the year 1996, the number of reported arrests had fallen to less than 
465,000 for people over eighteen."). 
30. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (discussing how in Wisconsin, 
the first offense for driving while intoxicated was a non-criminal civil forfeiture 
violation). 
31. Eric J. Gouvin, Note & Comment, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A 
New Approach to an Old Problem, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 99, 119 (1986). 
32. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 281 
(1983). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 282. 
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those whose situations are similar to their own. How many judges, 
when sentencing a drunk driver back before drunk driving came to be 
regarded as seriously as it is now, thought that there but for fortune 
go I? It is hardly surprising, therefore, that sentences meted out to 
drunk drivers were for the most part lenient, especially where no 
physical injury to others was involved. 
For these reasons, drunk driving was a crime that through the 
1970s was not viewed or treated as the serious crime that most have 
come to regard it as today. It is time now to look into what changed 
the way drunk driving is regarded in the United States. How did 
drunk driving become a hot crime? 
In 1980, Candi Lightner, a California real estate agent, suffered a 
life-altering personal loss when a drunken hit-and-run driver killed 
her thirteen-year-old daughter, Cari, as she walked down a suburban 
street.35 Lightner later wrote that, "I promised myself on the day of 
Cari's death that I would fight to make this needless homicide count 
for something positive in the years ahead."36 And so she did. Later 
that year, Candi Lightner became the organizer and founding presi-
dent of Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") whose mission was 
"to aid the victims of crimes performed by individuals driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, to aid the families of such victims 
and to increase public awareness of the problem of drinking and 
drugged driving."37 Over the years the mission of MADD has come to 
include the elimination of drunk driving and the prevention of under-
age drinking.38 
As MADD and other citizen-based anti-drunk driving organiza-
tions insinuated their way more and more into the public conscious-
ness, lawmakers began to respond to the growing call to do something 
about drunk driving accidents. For example, Senator Frank 
Lautenberg became concerned that although the minimum drinking 
age in his state of New Jersey was twenty-one, many under that age 
were crossing the Hudson River and purchasing liquor in N ew York 
where the minimum age was eighteen.39 With the avid support of 
35. Laurie Davies, 25 Years of Saving Lives, MADD (Fall 2005), http://www.madd. 
org/aboutus/bistory/madd25thhistory. pdf. 
36. Candy Lightner, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCandy_Lightner (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
37. History of the Mission Statement, MADD (2011), http://www.madd.org/about-
us/mission!. 
38. Id. Other organizations with missions similar to MADD were forming as well. 
For example, Students Against Destructive Decisions, originally Students Against Driv-
ing Drunk, was formed in 1981 in Massachusetts. History ofSADD, SADD (2011), http:/ 
/www.sadd.org/history.htm. 
39. See Mary Pat Treuthart, Lowering the Bar: Rethinking Underage Drinking, 9 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 303, 310 n.34 (2006). 
40 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
MADD, Senator Lautenberg proposed an amendment that later be-
came law requiring all states within two years to raise the minimum 
age for a person to purchase or possess alcoholic beverages to twenty-
one.40 A state failing to do this would lose 10% of its federal highway 
funds. 41 
The state of South Dakota challenged the new law, citing con-
cerns related to federalism and the overuse of Congressional authority 
under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution.42 The 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected this challenge in South Dakota v. Dole,43 
and within a short time, every state whose drinking age was lower 
than twenty-one capitulated and complied with the new law. 
B. CHILD ABUSE 
Unlike drunk driving, in modern America there has never been 
any question about the seriousness of the sexual abuse of children. 
What there was, however, was a misperception about its breadth and 
prevalence.44 We know now that child abuse is not that rare and oc-
curs in all socio-economic groupS.45 In part because this was such an 
uncomfortable and almost unthinkable realization, people refused to 
think about it. Law enforcement officers, relatives, friends, neighbors, 
teachers, medical personnel, and social workers were rarely educated 
about the signs that existed indicating that a child was the victim of 
sexual abuse.46 In turn, they did not actively look for such signs ex-
cept in those extremely rare cases when something was directly re-
ported to them.47 While children are sometimes taken and abused by 
strangers, we now know that the vast majority of child sex abusers are 
either members of the child's family or family friends and acquaint-
40. Author of21 Drinking Age Law Sen. Frank Lautenberg Celebrates the 21st. An-
niversary of that Important Measure, FRANK R. LAUTENBERG (Apr. 13, 2005), http:// 
lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=254503. States also took dramatic 
steps to turn the law against drunk drivers. Reinarman, supra note 27, at 105--08. 
President Reagan initially opposed the law but later changed his mind because his advi-
sors recognized the issue as a "sleeping giant." Id. at 100. 
41. Id. at 99-100. 
42. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
43. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
44. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1993) (docu-
menting belief that child abuse in the United States was rare). 
45. Id. 
46. See generally Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten-
Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 650 (2009). 
47. See generally Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177,186-87 (1983). 
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ances.48 This was a major contributing factor to why the crime often 
went unnoticed and why it was not reported.49 
Another factor contributing to the underreporting of child abuse 
cases was the very nature of child abuse itself.50 How much and what 
forms of discipline was a parent permitted to undertake with a child 
before it could be regarded as abusive behavior? On the other end of 
the spectrum, how much affection was permitted before the conduct 
became sexual in nature? By adding to this uncertainty the fact that 
until relatively recently children in western nations were considered 
the property of their parents,51 it becomes clearer still why so many 
instances of child abuse never were exposed. 
In the 1970s, awareness of the child abuse problem increased be-
cause of a number of factors. With the civil rights and feminist move-
ments becoming prominent in America, and due to a number of 
economic factors, far greater numbers of women began entering the 
workforce during this period. 52 The last time such a phenomenon oc-
curred was during WWII due to the absence of men needed to fill jobs 
in the American economy. 53 Back then, in the midst of the wartime 
spirit of help, families and friends pitched in to care for the children 
while the women worked and the men fought in the war. In the 1970s 
and beyond, this role was undertaken to a great degree by day care 
centers. 54 The result of this was that young children were cared for in 
large numbers by adults who were largely unknown to the parents. 
After combining the increasing societal awareness of and sensitiv-
ity to child sex abuse, the horror with which almost everyone regarded 
such crimes, and the fact that more and more children were being 
cared for by relative strangers, it is clear that all that was needed for 
an explosion in how child sex abuse was regarded was a match to light 
the fuse of reaction. A series of multi-victim, multi-offender child 
abuse prosecutions that began in the early 1980s in Bakersfield and 
48. See Bela August Walker, Essay: Deciphering Risks: Sex Offender Statutes and 
Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 185 (2010). 
49. See Kamala London et aI., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the 
Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 194, 
195 (2005). 
50. CYNTHIA CROSSON-ToWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1993). 
51. [d. 
52. See FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARIANNE A. FERBER & ANNE E. WINKLER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 69 (1986). 
53. See MARy P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 267 (1975); Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, 
Working Mothers and the Workplace - Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are 
Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197,201-03 (2009). 
54. See Donald E. Messer & Bonnie J. Messer, Day Care: A Need Crying to Be 
Heard, RELIGION-ONLINE (Nov. 6, 1974), http://www.religion-online.org/showarticie.asp? 
title=1599. 
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Kern County, California55 and continued through the McMartin Pre-
school case in 198356 lit that match. The explosion resulting from 
these prosecutions was not completely extinguished until 1996 when 
the convictions of the Kern County defendants were overturned.57 
In these and other such cases, the nature of the hot crimes phe-
nomenon can be seen quite clearly. Overly eager police with the help 
of overly eager "child therapy professionals" feed the results of their 
efforts to crusading prosecutors who charge criminal defendants based 
on evidence obtained in a highly suggestive manner58 and often not 
supported by physical or other evidence. 59 Evidence that points to 
any conclusion short of child abuse is either ignored or covered Up.60 
The media plays up the cases in ever more horrifying ways, inciting 
the public and leading to even more questionable prosecutions.61 
From such things, societal excess is born and nurtured. 
III. EXCESS 
Societal over-reaction to a hot crime can be shown in a variety of 
ways depending largely on what group or institution is the source of 
the over-reaction. Citizens groups call for extreme responses, the me-
dia describes the crimes in progressively more strident language, the 
police and prosecutors rely on techniques for prevention or apprehen-
sion that do not pass the usual tests for reliability, and courts abandon 
well-established principles in determining the legality of procedures 
designed to combat hot crimes. In examining the approaches taken to 
combat drunk driving and child sexual abuse as they became hot 
crimes, one can see several of these types of over-reaction. 
A. DRUNK DRIVING 
Faced with pressure from groups like Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving ("MADD") and Remove Intoxicated Drivers ("RID"), law en-
55. See, e.g., People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 
757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
56. John Earl, The Dark Truth About the "Dark Tunnels of McMartin," 7 INST. FOR 
PSYCHOL. THERAPIES, 1995, available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume7/j7 
_2_1.htm. 
57. Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, http://www.ny 
times.com/2004l09/19/magazinelI9KIDSL.html?pagewanted=all&position=. 
58. Dana D. Anderson, Note, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2144-49 (1996). 
59. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD Mo-
LESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 171-72 (1998). 
60. See Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, the Rules of Evidence, 
and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 227, 237-38 (1987). 
61. See VALERIE J. CALLANAN, FEEDING THE FEAR OF CRIME: CRIME-RELATED MEDIA 
AND SUPPORT FOR THREE STRIKES 53-56 (2005). 
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forcement authorities felt a greater need to apprehend drunk drivers 
and to be seen doing SO.62 Traditionally, police officers arrested drunk 
drivers most often by observing the manner in which the driver is op-
erating the car. Officers would notice both the obvious signs of the 
drunk driver, such as erratic driving, as well as those less obvious 
ones they had been trained to observe, such as a car being driven in 
cold weather with the windows wide open.63 Usually these officers 
looked for the telltale signs of drunk driving from their patrol cars 
while they were either driving or parked on the sides of the road. At 
times, officers positioned themselves outside certain bars and made 
arrests as they saw intoxicated persons exiting the bar and starting 
their cars.64 
Arrests made in all of these situations generally complied with 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In 1979, the Court held in Delaware v. Prouse65 that 
in non-exceptional circumstances, before the police could pull over a 
vehicle in transit, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that 
the driver of the vehicle or the vehicle itself was in violation of some 
law or regulation.66 Ten years before Prouse, the Court held in the 
landmark case of Terry v. Ohio67 that persons on the street could not 
be subjected to investigative seizures unless there was articulable sus-
picion that criminal activity was afoot.68 In the traditional police in-
vestigative stop of a suspected drunk driver, the officer could point to 
the specific reasons (those signs exhibited by the manner in which the 
car was being operated) that led the officer to become suspicious. It 
was the presence of these specific, suspicious signs that satisfied the 
Fourth Amendment seizure requirements set forth in Terry and 
Prouse.69 
Faced with the increasing awareness of the public and govern-
ment officials to the danger posed by drunk drivers and the demand to 
do something about the problem, some police departments began ex-
perimenting with an entirely different kind of investigative tech-
62. Police DUI arrests increased by more than 50%, reaching 20 million arrests in 
1982. A History of the Science and Law Behind DUl, 1 TRAFFIC SAFETY CENTER, no. 3, 
Summer 2003, available at http://safetrec.berkeley.edulnewsletterISummer03IDUlHis-
tory.html; see, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 59, at 218; see also Reinarman, supra note 27, at 
105-08. 
63. H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 
1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1973). 
64. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 110. 
65. 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). 
66. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). 
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
68. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
69. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648. 
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nique.70 This new enforcement technique allowed the police to detain 
the driver for investigation without any requirement that the police 
suspected the driver of drunk driving or any other violation of the 
law.71 It required stopping every car or stopping cars in some sys-
temic, non-discriminatory manner (i.e. every third car) that passed 
through a checkpoint set up by the police. Often these checkpoints 
were established on roadways strategically selected because they ei-
ther led away from areas that contained bars or were the scene of 
many accidents.72 Known as sobriety checkpoints, these detentions 
were designed to be fairly brief but allowed the officer enough time to 
talk to the driver to observe certain signs of intoxication, such as diffi-
culty in taking out a driver's license, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or 
the odor of alcohol on the breath. The public was told that because 
many drunk drivers do not give off signs that police could detect 
merely by observing driving patterns, these checkpoints would be far 
more successful at apprehending drunk drivers than the traditional 
means of doing so discussed above. Many of these roadblocks were set 
up on weekend nights, the time that the highest number of drunk 
drivers was on the roads.73 In looking closely at the attention they 
received, their lack of success in combating drunk driving, and the 
manner in which courts assessed their constitutionality, sobriety 
checkpoints serve as instructive analytic tools in examining what hap-
pens when a crime becomes hot. 
Proposed originally as a means of apprehending drunk drivers 
who posed a great danger to the walking and driving public, sobriety 
checkpoints soon proved rather conclusively to be ineffective at catch-
ing drunk drivers.74 While the statistics varied somewhat, sobriety 
checkpoints fairly consistently reported that 1% or less of the drivers 
passing through them were arrested for alcohol or drug related driv-
ing offenses.75 When taking into consideration that most of these 
checkpoints were set up at night and often on weekends, the time 
70. See Richard A. HIt, Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457 (1983). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1461-63; JACOBS, supra note 12, at 111. 
73. Steven P. Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment 
Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 157 (1984). 
74. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 460 n.2, 461 n.3 (1990) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Grossman, supra note 73, at 158-59, 163-64. 
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beaman, 880 A.2d 578, 590 (Pa. 2005) (Nigro, J., 
dissenting) ("The empirical data before our Court establishes that during the years 
1999-2001, only .71 percent of all drivers stopped at suspicionless checkpoints were 
charged with DUl .... "); Jack Gillum, DUI Checkpoints Costly, Catch Few, ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR, Aug. 27, 2007 (stating that of the fewer than 1% of drivers stopped at sobriety 
checkpoints and arrested on suspicion of DUI, half of that number were ever convicted); 
Police Term Drunken-Driver Crackdown a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1983, at B1. 
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when the highest percentage of drivers was intoxicated, their failure 
to apprehend such drivers becomes even clearer.76 Experts believe 
that roughly 7-8% of nighttime drivers are legally intoxicated.77 This 
would mean that sobriety checkpoints are arresting about one out of 
every seven or eight drunk drivers who pass through them.78 
One of the largest sobriety checkpoints programs established in 
the 1980s took place in New York City from May 27 through June 26, 
1983.79 These checkpoints were typical of most checkpoint operations 
in that they were set up at night, mostly on weekends, when the high-
est percentage of drivers were believed to be drunk, and the locations 
were changed daily so that drivers would not be expecting them.80 
During the month in which the checkpoints operated, 100 police of-
ficers stopped 184,828 drivers at the checkpoints.81 Of that number, 
210 were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.82 So 100 officers spent a month arresting one-eighth of the 1% 
of drivers they stopped at these sobriety checkpoints, likely less than 
one out of twenty of the intoxicated drivers who drove through them. 
It was hardly surprising that the New York City program, like 
virtually all other such sobriety checkpoint programs, failed at appre-
hending drunk drivers.83 Officers had a very limited time, generally 
only ten to fifteen seconds, to observe drivers at these checkpoints. 
This is because in order to comply with Fourth Amendment holdings 
regarding suspicionless seizures, the detentions have to be brief and 
relatively unintrusive.84 Thus more comprehensive and reliable ways 
of determining if one was intoxicated, such as blood or breath tests 
76. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77. RICHARD COMPTON & AMY BERNING, RESULTS OF THE 2007 NATIONAL ROADSIDE 
SURVEY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE BY DRIVERS (2009), available at httpJ/www.ondcp. 
gov/publicationslpdfJ07roadsidesurvey.pdf. This report also notes that for the first time 
in 2007, the report took into account other drugs in nighttime drivers' systems and 
found that 14.4% of nighttime drivers were drug-positive. Id. 
78. Id.; see also Post Details: Sobriety Checkpoint Statistics Speak for Themselves, 
ROADBLOCK REVELATIONS (Feb. 23, 2007), https://www.checkpointusa.org/blog/index. 
php/2007/02l23/p25 (reporting that a Pima County, Arizona sobriety checkpoint pro-
gram that occurred during Labor Day Weekend 2006 had a DUI arrest rate of approxi-
mately.6%). 





83. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460 n.2, 461 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens 
reviewed the success rate of various states' sobriety checkpoint records. He noted that 
Maryland's program achieved a .3% arrest rate, Arizona had a .2% arrest rate, Califor-
nia had a 0% arrest rate, Indiana had a 7% arrest rate, Indiana had a 2.6% arrest rate, 
Kansas had an approximate arrest rate of .6%, Massachusetts had a 1.6% arrest rate, 
and New Hampshire had a .9% arrest rate. Id. 
84. Grossman, supra note 73, at 159 n.197. 
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were not permitted at the initial stop. Upon approaching such a check-
point, any but the most intoxicated of drivers would surely have hid 
any bottle of alcohol, perhaps popped a breath mint, and collected 
himself sufficiently to pass a brief visual inspection through a car win-
dow by flashlight at night. That same driver would make it his busi-
ness to drive especially carefully as he came to the checkpoint. He 
would not give off the signals that trained officers could observe while 
watching driving patterns from off a road or highway. When ap-
proaching such a checkpoint, it was unlikely that a driver would drive 
erratically or violate traffic laws such as going through red lights, 
speeding, and not driving within the traffic lane. At that time, there 
would be more subtle signs that officers at checkpoints were unlikely 
to observe but that trained police officers observing a driver in the 
flow of traffic knew to be clues that one might be driving impaired. 
Examples of such signs would be a driver who kept his window open in 
cold weather or applied his directional signal well before needing to. 
Faced with the failure of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend the 
vast majority of drunk drivers who passed through them, the propo-
nents of the checkpoints shifted their attention to another claimed 
benefit that would derive from such inspections.85 It was claimed that 
even if relatively few drunk drivers were arrested at the checkpoints, 
they would serve as effective deterrents to those people thinking of 
getting in their car after imbibing too much alcohol.86 The significance 
of this deterrent effect would be to reduce the large number of serious 
traffic accidents caused by drunk drivers and would be demonstrated 
by reductions in accident rates in places utilizing checkpoints. Deter-
rence is of course difficult to prove and therefore even more difficult to 
disprove. However, as with the apprehension rate discussed above, 
the available data at the time and the knowledge that existed about 
accidents caused by drunk driving again showed that sobriety check-
points were ineffective. 87 
Even though the claims regarding the effectiveness of sobriety 
checkpoints as a deterrent to drunk driving were not borne out, propo-
nents of the checkpoints continued making their claims anyway. For 
example, the Governor of Massachusetts boasted that the sobriety 
checkpoints established in his state over the Fourth of July weekend 
85. See, e.g., John Feinstein, Sobriety Checkpoints, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1982, at 
B1; Doug Jewett, State Should Adopt Swedish System of Deterrence, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 1983, at All; Police Term Drunken·Driver Crackdown a Success, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 1983, at B1; Sobriety Checkpoint Drunk·Driving Roadblock Set for Harford, 
BALT. SUN, Dec. 14, 1982, at Dl. 
86. NATL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SATURATION PATROLS & SOBRIETY 
CHECKPOINTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/peopielinjury/aicohoJJsatura-
tionpatroislSatPats2002. pdf. 
87. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
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in 1983 reduced the traffic fatalities in his state to the lowest level in a 
decade.ss What then accounted for the fact that during that same 
weekend traffic fatalities diminished nationwide to their lowest total 
in twenty-three years? Certainly it was not the few isolated check-
points that existed around the nation at that time. It is far more likely 
that the reduction could be attributed to increased awareness of the 
seriousness of the drunk driving problem resulting from the efforts of 
MADD and other groups, the deployment of more and better trained 
police officers in patrol cars looking for signs emitted by drunk driv-
ers, and changes in the law, such as raising the drinking age and stiff-
ening the penalties for drunk driving.s9 
The Maryland State Police also claimed that sobriety checkpoints 
prevented accidents and based this conclusion on data collected over a 
period of time longer than just one holiday weekend. From December 
1982 to February 1983, the total number of accidents (both alcohol 
and non-alcohol related) in one county using sobriety checkpoints was 
reported to be 125 less than the previous year when checkpoints were 
not used.90 In a control county, the accident rates were unchanged 
from the year before.91 
Although the figures for alcohol-related accidents in both counties 
in fact diminished by the same 10% from the previous year, the police 
maintained that these numbers showed the effectiveness of check-
points in preventing accidents.92 Of course, had the police looked at 
the same statistics for the same period of time from 'another nearby 
county of approximately the same size as the counties they reported 
on, their opinion might have been different. That county reported that 
both the number of fatal accidents and alcohol-related fatal accidents 
were halved from the year before without using checkpoints. This re-
duction was achieved through the deployment of carefully trained and 
strategically located police patrols looking for drivers evidencing signs 
ofimpairment.93 Additionally, the data coming from other counties of-
fered no support for the deterrence benefit of sobriety checkpoints.94 
88. BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1983, at 23 col. 3 (statement of Mass. Governor). 
89. In fact, traffic fatalities nationally during that 1983 Fourth of July weekend 
were the lowest for any weekend in the previous twenty-three years. Id. at 23 cols. 3, 4, 
5, & 6. 
90. Karen Hosler, State Likely to Widen Sobriety Checkpoints, BALT. SUN, May 24, 




94. See Beaman, 880 A.2d at 590 (Nigro, J., dissenting) (discussing statistics dur-
ing 1999-2001, 7.69% of arrests made by roving patrols resulted in DUI arrests, as com-
pared with the .71% of arrests made at sobriety checkpoints); H. LAURENCE Ross, 
DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 66 (1984); Karina 
loffee, Statistics Spark Debate on Whether DUI Checkpoints Work, RECORDNET.COM 
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In addition to being less effective in terms of arresting impaired 
drivers, sobriety checkpoints also consume more man hours than rov-
ing patrols. One judge took note of the fact that a DUI arrest at some 
checkpoints required 28.77 man-hours, whereas a patrol required only 
18.82 man-hours before a DUI arrest.95 
As with the failure of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend drunk 
drivers, so too is the data showing no deterrent benefit from them 
hardly surprising. Clearly, drunk drivers cause many serious acci-
dents, and the benefit of deterring drunk driving is said to be that 
doing so would significantly reduce the number of such accidents. An 
examination of who these drunk drivers are and an understanding of 
how deterrence works, however, makes clear why sobriety checkpoints 
were not effective in reducing accidents or deterring those drivers 
most likely to cause them. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") 
has concluded that two-thirds of those who drive intoxicated are either 
alcoholics or problem drinkers.96 This is particularly significant be-
cause NHTSA and other commentators consider problem drinkers and 
alcoholics to be virtually incapable of being deterred from driving in-
toxicated.97 As one commentator noted, "[T]he problem drinker whose 
very life is subjected to his most often uncontrollable desires-perhaps 
compulsion-to drink to excess will not be prevented from driving on 
the roadways in an intoxicated condition by a fine ... or a jail term."98 
This makes sense because the theory of crime prevention known as 
deterrence requires that an individual thinking about committing a 
crime weighs the advantages (the benefits either pecuniary or other-
wise) against the likelihood of being apprehended and the punishment 
he or she will receive if convicted.99 The more the potential criminal 
intends and plans a crime and then weighs the potential consequences 
of doing so, the more deterrence is said to work as a crime preventer. 
(Sept. 18, 2005), http://www.recordnet.comlapps/pbcs.dlIlarticle? AID=/20050918/NEWS 
011509180321 (reporting that states that use roving patrols rather than sobriety check-
points saw a steeper decline in alcohol-related traffic deaths). 
95. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 590 (Nigro, J., dissenting). 
96. NA'r'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ALCOHOL 
SAFETY ACTION PROJECTS 2 (1979). 
97. Roger C. Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 AB.A J. 995, 998 
(1968); Joseph W. Little, Control of the Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal Crea-
tivity, 54 AB.A J. 555,557 (1968); Comment, Deterring the Drinking Driver: Treatment 
v. Punishment, 7 UCLA ALAsKA L. REV. 244, 253 (1978); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 96, at 2. 
98. Marvin Wagner, Problem Drinking v. Public Safety, 7 TRIAL, no. 3, May-June 
1971, at 26, 28. 
99. See Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deter-
rence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 438 (1969); see also Johannes Andenaes, The Effects of 
Scandinavia's Drinking-and-Driving Laws: Facts and Hypotheses, 6 SCANDINAVIAN 
STUD. CRIMINOLOGY 35, 46 (1978). 
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Obviously, alcoholics and problem drinkers are usually less capable as 
well as less inclined to weigh carefully their chances of being appre-
hended and the consequences of such apprehension before they get 
into their cars while drunk.1oo They are, therefore, most unlikely to 
fall into the category of those likely to be deterred by potential arrest 
and punishment. This is not to say that drunk drivers do not deserve 
the punishments they receive (corresponding to the theory of punish-
ment known as retribution), but only that they are unlikely to be de-
terred by them. 
So the one-third of drunk drivers who are considered social drink-
ers and who cause a lower number of traffic accidents is the only 
group that has any realistic potential of being deterred from driving 
drunk by knowing about sobriety checkpoints. For these drivers to be 
meaningfully deterred, they must believe there is a significant chance 
they will be apprehended. In 1979, shortly before sobriety checkpoints 
begin to appear with some frequency, it was estimated that for every 
2,000 trips taken by drunk drivers, only one resulted in arrest. 101 
Given their low rates of apprehension and the fact that they take traf-
fic patrol personnel away from watching for and arresting those actu-
ally observed driving drunk, sobriety checkpoints were unlikely to 
change those numbers. Therefore, unless drivers have a misconcep-
tion about their realistic chances of being arrested for driving drunk, 
even social drinkers who may think about the consequences of what 
they are doing are not especially likely to be deterred by sobriety 
checkpoints. 
Given their ineffectiveness in both arresting and deterring drunk 
drivers,102 why then were sobriety checkpoints championed so vigor-
ously by anti-drunk driving interest groups and certain members of 
the law enforcement community? One thing about sobriety check-
points was undisputed. They made news. Newspapers and local televi-
sion news programs frequently wrote about or showed them, being 
careful not to reveal their locations. Politicians, like the Governor of 
Massachusetts, could point to them as proof that they recognized the 
problem and were serious about dealing with it. Interest groups had 
tangible evidence that the pressure they were putting on law enforce-
ment agencies and politicians was paying off. So what if the check-
100. Michael F. Lotito, Note, Unsteady on its Feet: Sobriety Checkpoint Reasonable-
ness, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 735, 761-62 (2010) (stating that pre-problem and problem 
drinkers cannot be considered rational in terms of their drinking and therefore sobriety 
checkpoints have little deterrent value to these types of drinkers). 
101. See Tracy Cameron, The Impact of Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Re-
view and Evaluation, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 495, 511 (1979); see also NAT'L HIGHWAY 
SAFETY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 96, at 2; Ross, supra note 94, at 87. 
102. Even police officers doubt the effectiveness of DUI checkpoints. See Sitz, 496 
U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Grossman, supra note 70. 
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points did not help deal with the actual problem of drunk driving? 
They satisfied many other needs that were particularly relevant to the 
phenomena of hot crimes. In the words ofU.8. Supreme Court Justice 
Stevens, "[S]obriety checkpoints are elaborate, and disquieting, pub-
licity stunts."103 
Sometimes satisfying these needs resulted merely in a waste of 
time or money. Sometimes they drained resources from being used for 
other efforts to deal with the drunk driving problem that were more 
effective but less flashy. Additionally, sometimes they led to stretch-
ing or crossing the boundaries of the law to accommodate the enforce-
ment program. 
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court tackled the issue ofthe constitu-
tionality of sobriety checkpoints. In Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz,104 the Court held that although stopping a car at a 
checkpoint was indeed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it was 
a "reasonable" seizure despite the absence of the articulable suspicion 
traditionally required for such seizures.105 The Court's opinion in Sitz 
is most notable for the surprising way it abandoned its previous ap-
proach to suspicionless automobile seizures106 and its cavalier treat-
ment of a record that, in assessing the effectiveness of sobriety 
checkpoints, demonstrated that even the most charitable reading of 
the record showed little indication that such checkpoints were 
successful. 107 
The majority in Sitz determined that the method for analyzing 
the constitutionality of these checkpoint seizures involved a test de-
rived from its holding in Brown v. Texas,108 which required a ''weigh-
ing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the 
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the se-
verity of the interference with individual liberty."109 All parties 
agreed the danger posed by drunk drivers was indeed a grave one, so 
attention turned to the next factor: the degree to which sobriety check-
points contribute to dealing with this danger. In a detailed analysis of 
the data available from the record compiled by both parties to the law-
103. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 475 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[S]obriety check-
points are elaborate, and disquieting, publicity stunts.") 
104. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
105. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (citing Treasury Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989)). • 
106. Id. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 209, 210 (1979)) (stating that in most cases, the police must possess probable cause 
for a seizure to be judged reasonable). 
107. See id. at 454-55 (admitting that "approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers 
passing through the checkpoint [at issue] were arrested for alcohol impairment."). 
108. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
109. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448-50 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). 
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suit challenging the Michigan checkpoints, the trial judge found that 
sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of combating drunk 
driving. llo The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this finding.lll 
The U.S. Supreme Court appeared at first to reject even the need to 
examine the effectiveness of the seizure and then seemed to defend 
the effectiveness of the checkpoints, albeit in a cursory manner. 112 
The Court rejected the seemingly obvious conclusion of the Michi-
gan courts that in order for a suspicionless and therefore extraordi-
nary seizure to "advance the public interest," it must be at least 
somewhat effective in achieving its purpose.ll3 Instead, the Court 
held that the determination of effectiveness is largely for the lawen· 
forcement agency itself to make and not for the courts. 114 In defending 
this position, the Court referred to the language in Brown as a "gen· 
eral[ized] reference," and then went on to refute the Michigan court's 
analysis of how this test was applied in the Court's Delaware v. Prouse 
and United States v. Martinez·Fuerte 115 holdings.116 
In Prouse, the Court determined that, in order to rid the roads of 
unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles, random stops of automobiles 
without any individualized suspicion of criminal activity violated the 
Fourth Amendment. ll7 The Sitz majority acknowledged that in 
Prouse, "we observed that no empirical evidence indicated that such 
stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety."1l8 
The Sitz Court then quoted from Prouse that "it seems common sense 
that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are driving without 
a license is very small and the number of licensed drivers who will be 
stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large in-
deed."119 The Sitz Court did not mention that the Prouse opinion re-
ferred to the question at issue in the case as to whether there was a 
"sufficiently productive mechanism" to justify the seizure of an auto-
mobile.12o Nor did it mention that in deciding this issue, the Prouse 
Court considered "the alternative methods available" in reaching its 
conclusion that "the incremental contribution to highway safety" of 
110. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (reporting that the Michigan trial court found the 
checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 449 (discussing the magnitude of the drunk driving problem and the 
level of intrusion on seized motorists at checkpoints before discussing the effectiveness 
of sobriety checkpoints). 
113. Id. at 453. 
114. Id. 
115. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
116. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. 
117. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. 
118. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454. 
119. Id. 
120. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. 
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the automobile stops in that case did not justify seizures without any 
individualized suspicion.121 Thus, the Prouse Court did see clear con-
stitutional relevance in assessing the effectiveness of the law enforce-
ment procedure at issue. 
The Sitz Court responded to this discussion of effectiveness in 
Prouse by attempting to distinguish the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz 
from the stops to check for unlicensed drivers in Prouse. First, it noted 
that Prouse involved a random stop rather than a checkpoint.122 
While this is true and, as the Court had held previously, has a bearing 
on the degree of the intrusion, it in no way detracts from the language 
in Prouse requiring a judicial analysis of the effectiveness of the law 
enforcement method involved in a suspicionless seizure. Second, the 
Sitz Court said that unlike Prouse, it did not involve "a complete ab-
sence of empirical data" supporting the law enforcement program.123 
An examination of that data, however, is wholly unsupportive of the 
notion that checkpoints achieve either of their goals. 
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that a fixed checkpoint close 
to the United States-Mexico border that was established to apprehend 
and deter smugglers of undocumented aliens did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.124 The Sitz Court pointed to the fact that border 
area checkpoints netted a smaller arrest to detention ratio than the 
sobriety checkpoints at issue in Sitz. To the Court, this apparently 
demonstrated that the low apprehension level at sobriety checkpoints 
did not prove their ineffectiveness.125 What is notable about the Sitz 
Court's references to the Martinez-Fuerte opinion, however, is what 
the Court then said and what it did not say. 
The Sitz Court quoted from Martinez-Fuerte that the record in 
that case "provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the 
San Clemente checkpoint."126 Thus the Court in Martinez-Fuerte 
looked directly at effectiveness as a factor in determining the constitu-
tionality of the checkpoint. In fact, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte went 
on to assess the effectiveness of that checkpoint in ways that would be 
most instructive in evaluating sobriety checkpoints.127 The Martinez-
Fuerte Court noted that the checkpoints were an integral part of a 
comprehensive method of apprehending and preventing the smug-
121. [d. 
122. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454. 
123. [d. 
124. See United States v. Marlinez-Fuerle, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976). 
125. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
126. [d. (emphasis added). 
127. Martinez·Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 553-54. 
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gling of illegal aliens across the border with Mexico. l2;3 Set up in stra-
tegic locations on high-speed highways leading away from the border, 
the checkpoints were designed to deny the smugglers access to high-
ways that made for easy escape and access to large cities. As the Mar-
tinez-Fuerte Court declared, referring to cars used to smuggle 
undocumented aliens across the border, "[T]he prospect of such inquir-
ies forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled, 
slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detec-
tion by roving patrols."l29 Thus, despite the fact that such check-
points uncovered comparatively few undocumented aliens, the 
Martinez-Fuerte Court regarded them as integral parts of a compre-
hensive scheme to protect the areas around the Mexican border from 
those who smuggle undocumented aliens across it. There was no evi-
dence in Sitz, nor does it seem likely, that sobriety checkpoints have 
any comparable benefit.l30 
In its opinion in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court observed that without 
checkpoints stopping cars for "particularized study," there was no way 
of identifying the cars carrying undocumented aliens driving on high-
speed roads. l3l In contrast, the Prouse Court noted that traffic laws 
were best enforced through police reaction to observed violations. l32 
As to the deterrent impact of checking for unlicensed drivers before 
developing individualized suspicion, the Court asserted that such 
drivers, who are undeterred by the possibility of being discovered after 
suspicious activity or at post-accident investigations, are unlikely to 
be deterred by random inspections. l33 Such reasoning applies with 
more force to drunk drivers who, for reasons noted earlier, are even 
less susceptible to deterrence and who are far more likely to exhibit 
128. See id. at 556-57 (noting that checkpoints apprehend smugglers and illegal 
aliens who use major highways and increases detections of such persons by forcing them 
onto less traveled roads). 
129. Id. at 557 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-85 (1975». 
130. See James H. Newhouse, Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Move-
ment: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 CAL. L. REV 907, 915 (1963) (stating that 
checkpoint roadblocks set up to check drivers licenses is a "safety measure which ap-
plies to all roads within the state, and violation is as likely in one place as another") 
(emphasis added). In State v. Olgaard, the court noted that motorists could not have 
been aware of the sobriety checkpoint roadblock in question and all motorists unexpect-
edly encountered the checkpoint on that road. 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D. 1976). Be-
cause sobriety checkpoints interdict motorists by surprise and take officers away from 
patrolling side roads, they are unlikely to be part of any similar comprehensive scheme 
to force motorists onto smaller roads where detection of criminal activity might be eas-
ier, as discussed in Martinez-Fuerte. 
131. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. 
132. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. 
133. Id. at 660. 
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signs of their condition to police officers observing their driving 
pattern. l34 
In examining the level ofthe intrusion generated by the seizure at 
sobriety checkpoints (the third part of the Brown test), the Sitz Court 
analogized sobriety checkpoints to border area checkpoints. l35 The 
Court here dismissed the distinction between checkpoints whose loca-
tions are known and those that catch the driver by surprise. l36 Previ-
ous cases had held that the unpredictability or frightening nature of a 
seizure significantly raises the level of the intrusion. l37 
The holding in Sitz was deeply flawed both as to its interpretation 
of previous Supreme Court holdings and its treatment or non-treat-
ment of the empirical data contained in the record of the case. l38 
Worse still it gave the ultimate judicial sanction to a law enforcement 
technique born of the media's and public's understandable but misdi-
rected concern about the serious problem posed by drunk drivers. 
The use of sobriety checkpoints to combat drunk driving serves as 
a notable example of a flawed response to hot crimes. Law enforce-
ment chose a crime prevention mechanism that at best had a highly 
dubious record of success and at worst proved to be a clear failure for 
dealing with the crime problem. What the mechanism does have work-
ing for it, however, is that it is highly visible. Politicians leap to sup-
port the mechanism because it is a concrete sign that they are 
sensitive to the problem and innovative in their approach to dealing 
with it. They use the media to help spread their message. Courts rely 
on deeply flawed empirical support or find excuses to discount the 
need for empirical support in upholding the program. Worse still, they 
stretch their reasoning and the use of precedent in finding no constitu-
tional violation exists. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Sitz, 
"[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a 
laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional 
analysis."l39 
Another manifestation of hot crimes is the rise of one-issue inter-
est groups formed exclusively to combat the problem crime. The ubiq-
uitous advocacy group, Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), 
played a significant role in piping up public angst about drunk driv-
134. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
135. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453. 
136. [d. at 451-52. 
137. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 
891,895 (1975); see generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
138. See State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004) ("Sitz was a radical 
departure from how a Terry-style balancing test had previously been applied and how 
the state and individual interests should have been weighed in the context of such 
roadblocks. "). 
139. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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ing. MADD drew attention to such things as the seriousness of the 
problem created by the drunk driver,140 the overly lenient sentences 
that many drunk drivers received at that time, and the need for new 
legislation. 141 All of these actions were good to a point. 
While MADD has forever changed the way the public perceives 
drunk driving, the organization has undergone a paradigm shift in re-
cent years. One journalist grouped MADD with other "charities gone 
bad" because it has taken advantage of its past success to inoculate it 
from its fundamental change in focus and tactics.142 For instance, 
MADD has shifted from "Don't drive drunk" to "Don't drink and drive" 
and seeks to put breathalyzers in every new car in America. 143 Even 
Candy Lightner, MADD's founder, believes the organization she be-
gan has succumbed to social hysteria regarding drunk driving.144 
Lightner abandoned the organization145 in part because she believed 
MADD's missionary zeal for punishment caused the organization to 
lose its direction thereby doing the victims of drunk drivers a disser-
vice.146 She also leveled accusations against MADD that it manipu-
lated data, so called "Chicken Little" tactics, in order to justify "neo-
Prohibitionist" public policies.147 For instance, MADD "defines down" 
drunk driving by arguing that even low blood alcohol content ("BAC") 
while driving equate to dangerous driving under the influence. MADD 
does this despite the fact that evidence suggests that driver fatality 
rates do not increase appreciably until a BAC reaches .1%.148 Fur-
thermore, even if social hysteria is not to blame for MADD's excesses, 
140. MADD created a high recognition rate with its brand in part by using rhetori-
cal devices such as drunk driver instead of driving, holding itself out to be the "voice of 
the victim," and successful use of the media. See Reinarman, supra note 27, at 98-99, 
105-06. 
141. Id. at 100-01, 107-08. This included mandatory jail sentences, sharply in-
creased fines, reduced plea bargaining for drunk-driving offenses, lowering the BAC 
level for intoxicated from .10% to .08% or lower, and per se standards where certain 
BAC levels were in of themselves criminal. 
142. Richard Berman, Charities Behaving Badly; Dollars from Nai"ue Donors are 
Sometime Misused, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at B-1. 
143. Id. MADD has also become a bad investment for philanthropists. The Ameri-
can Institute of Philanthropy gave MADD poor marks for its fundraising practices, not-
ing that while charities should spend $35 or less to raise $100, MADD regularly doubles 
that amount. Id. 
144. Katherine Griffin, No Longer MADD, THIS WORLD, Aug. 7, 1994, at 8. 
145. In subsequent years after MADD, Lightner worked for the Beverage Institute, 
a lobbyist organization that lobbies on behalf of restaurateurs who have liquour li-
censes-a position at odds with her former role as the head of MADD. Walt Wiley, 
Candy Lightner's New Cause: MADD Founder Now Heads Group Fighting Bias Against 
Arabs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 18, 1994. 
146. Id. ("MADD helps you deal with anger ... but I really think it prolongs 
denial."). 
147. See Radley Balko, Targeting the Social Drinker Is Just MADD, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
9, 2002, http://www.cato.org/research/articlesibalko-021209.html. 
148. Id. 
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such defining down helps MADD reiterate its relevance and raise 
money.149 MADD's missionary zeal to punish drunk drivers has 
caused it to ignore equally or more dangerous drivers such as speed-
ers, cell phone users, and excessive drinkers.15o Lightner stated, "If 
we really want to save lives, let's go after the most dangerous drivers 
on the road."151 
Another manifestation of the hot crime syndrome is the passage 
and application of laws that are either of questionable value or are 
excessively intrusive. In Pennsylvania, for example, drivers can have 
their licenses removed on drunk driving grounds for honestly report-
ing to their doctor that they enjoy a daily six-pack ofbeer.152 In one 
instance, Keith Emerich, who sought medical help regarding an irreg-
ular heartbeat,153 told his doctor that he imbibed a six-pack of 
Budweisers a day. For this, his license was taken way,154 This oc-
curred without any showing that Emerich drove in violation of the 
drunk driving laws.155 
In addition, police are taking expansive steps to collect and pre-
serve evidence of drunk driving. Under a federal program, select 
Idaho police officers are carrying needles and being trained to with-
draw blood from suspected drunk drivers.156 This is in an effort to 
curtail the number of drunk driving trials and to see if blood drawing 
is an effective strategy against drunk driving.157 One Idaho deputy 
prosecutor noted that while the police cannot "hold down a suspect 
and force them to breathe into a tube," her understanding ofIdaho law 
was that the police could forcefully take blood.158 If the Idaho pro-
gram is successful, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-




152. Patrick Kerkstra, Fessing Up to Doctor Costs Drinker His License, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.doctordeluca_com/Library/PublicHealthlFessingUpTo 
DocCostsLicense04. pdf. 
153. Martha Raffaele, Court Upholds Suspension of Beer Drinker's License, AsSOCI-
ATED PRESS, Aug_ 17,2004_ 
154. Id. Though Emerich refused alcohol counseling or to have an interlock device 
placed in his vehicle, he did admit at his hearing to having had "a few beers" on occasion 
before driving. Id. 
155. Id. The court did note, however, that Emerich had a previous conviction for 
drunk driving. Id. 
156. Lawrence Taylor, DUI Cops Now Armed with Guns, Batons . .. and Needles, 
LAWRENCE TAYLOR's DUI BLOG (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.duiblog.comJ2009/09/16/dui-
cops-now-armed -with -guns-batonsand -needles!. 
157. See id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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In a similar vein, an Indiana man who was suspected of drunk 
driving was subdued and force-catheterized.160 The man registered a 
.07% BAC on a breathalyzer test and a search warrant was issued for 
blood and urine samples.161 Blood was drawn at a nearby hospital, 
however, the man was unable to provide a urine sample.162 The man 
was then shackled to his hospital bed and forcefully catheterized 
against his Will. 163 The blood test revealed that the man's BAC did 
not exceed the Indiana limit for driving.164 It is fair to question 
whether this procedure and the others noted above are warranted for 
suspected drunk driving. 
A recent policy to release certain offenders in Illinois further dem-
onstrates the societal over-reaction to drunk driving. In order to save 
five million dollars, low-level, non-violent offenders were released 
from a Chicago prison during the 2009 winter holiday season.165 The 
offenders included drunk drivers, burglars, financial criminals, and 
drug criminals.166 Upon learning of the early release of the drunk 
drivers, MADD intervened and pressured the State Corrections De-
partment to reclassify them as violent offenders.167 The Corrections 
Department succumbed to the pressure, agreed with MADD, and put 
eighteen drunk drivers back in prison while the burglars, drug 
criminals, and financial criminals remained released.16B 
In addition to the sometimes disproportionally harsh treatment 
drunk drivers receive, they are at times subject to penalties that apply 
only to them. For example, an Arizona law allows judges to fine DUI 
offenders for the cost of their stay in jail.169 This fine is unique to 
drunk drivers.170 Though law enforcement officials are encouraging 
160. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, WPBF.COM (Sept. 3, 2009), http:// 
www.wpbf.com/healthl207037311detail.html. 
161. Jennifer Nelson, Man Sues After Forced Catheterization, IND. LAw. (Sept. 1, 
2009), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/articleiprint?artic1eId=21195. 
162. Id. 
163. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, supra note 160; Nelson, supra note 
161. 
164. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, supra note 160. To boot, the DUI 
suspect was also charged with obstructing justice for his inability to provide a urine 
sample. See id. 
165. Frank Main & Chris Fusco, Early Release Ends for DUI Offenders: 18 Sent 
Back to Prison to Serve Out Terms, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at 2. 
166. Frank Main & Chris Fusco, Inmates Home for Holidays: Drunken Drivers, Rip-
Off Artists Stretch Definition of 'Non-Violent, Low-Lever Offenders,' CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2009. 
167. Main & Fusco, supra note 166, at 2. 
168. Id. 
169. More Ariz. Drunk Drivers Could Pay for Jail Stays, AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 7, 
2009), http://www.azcentral.com/newslarticlesl2009/09/07 120090907pimacounty-dui07-
ON.html; Lawrence Taylor, The DUI Double Standard, LAWRENCE TAYLOR'S DUI BLOG 
(Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.duiblog.coml2009/09/07 /the-dui-double-standard-4I. 
170. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-1444 (2011). 
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judges to mete out this fine, judges are reluctant to do so because of 
the huge financial costs already associated with drunk driving under 
Arizona law. l71 
Perhaps because they believe the drunk driving laws are not en-
forced adequately, some private citizens have taken justice into their 
own hands with regard to drunk drivers. Citizens in Milwaukee 
formed a group on Craigslist whose supposed purpose is to report 
drunk drivers to the authorities.172 The group stakes out a bar, waits 
for a seemingly overly intoxicated patron to enter his vehicle, and then 
reports the vehicle to the police.173 More controversial is the online 
statement by some members that they lie or exaggerate to ensure the 
police respond, regardless of whether a driver is operating his or her 
car dangerously.174 
As of late, with the advent of portable communication and en-
tertainment devices, some skeptics question whether drunk driving is 
the most pressing danger on the road. A Los Angeles Times article 
entitled "Targeting the Social Drinker is Just MADD" reported a Brit-
ish study that found that "cell phone use while driving caused signifi-
cantly more impairment than a .08 blood-alcohol level."175 That 
study's conclusion is supported by a Car and Driver study, which 
found that text message usage can be even more dangerous than alco-
hol impaired driving, especially at slower speeds.176 States have now 
responded to the dangers posed by drivers who use cell phones or send 
text messages, but such individuals are not treated with anywhere 
near the same harshness as those who drive while impaired by alco-
hol. These studies do not suggest that drunk driving is not a signifi-
cant danger, but they do raise questions about whether it is being 
treated with disproportionate harshness. 
B. CHILD SEX ABUSE 
In the early 1980s in Kern County, California, a string of child 
abuse cases arose in which many young children in the area voiced 
allegations of horrific and prolonged sexual abuse by family members, 
neighbors, and friends. These cases were fueled by suggestive inter-
171. Taylor, supra note 169. 
172. Brad Hicks, Fox 6 Exclusive: Craigslist DUI Busters, Fox6NOW.COM (Jan. 20, 
2010), http://www.fox6now.comlnewsiwiti-100 120-craigslist-narcs-dui,0, 7859851.story. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Balko, supra note 147. 
176. See Michael Austin, Texting While Driving: How Dangerous Is It?, CAR & 
DRIVER, June 2009, http://www.caranddriver.comlfeaturesl09q2ltexting_while_driving_ 
how _dangerous_is_it_-feature. 
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views and prosecutorial misconduct, which ultimately led the Califor-
nia appellate courts to overturn the convictions. 
In the 1985 case People v. Pitts,177 several adults in Kern County 
were accused of performing sexual acts on children and forcing the 
children to perform sexual acts on each other. As investigators and 
child services workers interviewed the children, their stories evolved 
and more child victims and adult abusers emerged.178 Eventually the 
children's allegations came to include tales of group sexual orgies.179 
Initially, when several additional children were questioned re-
garding their presence at these orgies, they vehemently denied it.180 
However, after being questioned by interviewers several times in a 
short period, the children changed their stories and claimed that they 
and others had been sexually abused.181 Based on this information 
alone, arrest warrants were issued and charges were brought against 
seven adults for conspiracy, forcible lewd and lascivious acts on chil-
dren under the age of fourteen, use of children for purposes of pornog-
raphy, child endangerment, and assault,182 
The children's allegations included being taped and photographed 
while being molested by the adults and being forced to perform vari-
ous sexual acts on each other.183 The children claimed they were 
forced to drink beer and whiskey and to consume drugs, including ma-
rijuana, cocaine, and heroin. 184 The children stated that they were 
strapped down to a board and injected with drugs if they failed to be-
have. l85 They claimed that they were threatened with knives and 
guns if they told anyone of the abuse. l86 
However, the children's stories were rampant with inconsisten-
cies about the time and location of the alleged abuse. The allegations 
regarding alcohol and drug use were also different in each child's testi-
mony. In addition, almost all ofthe children picked different individu-
als as their abusers from lineups conducted during the 
investigation.187 Some of the individuals chosen from the lineups had 
no relation to the case.188 Lastly, during searches of the defendants' 
177. 273 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1990). 
178. People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
179. Pitts, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 775. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 775-77. In fact, one child only conceded she had been abused several 
months into the investigation after meeting with investigators and social services work-
ers 20-25 times to discuss the allegations. [d. 
182. [d. at 771. 
183. [d. at 778. 
184. [d. at 778-81. 
185. [d. at 774-90. 
186. [d. at 778-81. 
187. [d. at 776. 
188. [d. 
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homes, no pornography, drug paraphernalia, cameras, or video equip-
ment was ever found. 189 
Nonetheless, each defendant was convicted of the charged crimes 
in 1985.190 The defendants were sentenced to varying terms of 285, 
373, and 405 years in prison.191 In 1990, however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth District of California overturned the convictions on 
appeal. 
On appeal, the court noted many forms of gross prosecutorial mis-
conduct in the way the investigation and prosecution were handled. 192 
The court documented several improper and argumentative remarks 
made by the prosecution during closing arguments.193 The question-
ing techniques of the prosecution during direct and cross examination 
of witnesses involved "inadmissible evidence and improper innu-
endo."194 Similarly, throughout the trial, the prosecutor attempted to 
prove his case using innuendos rather than relevant, material evi-
dence. Lastly, the appellate court found that the jury was improperly 
influenced by the trial judge's lack of impartiality. The appellate 
court noted several comments made by the trial judge in the presence 
of the jury, which implied that the prosecution's case was more credi-
ble and that the judge and prosecution were on the same side.195 
These various forms of gross misconduct during the investigation and 
subsequent trial compelled the appellate court to reverse the convic-
tions and sentences of the defendants. 
In People u. Stoll,196 a case that occurred in the same county and 
the same year as Pitts, four adults were charged with thirty-six counts 
of lewd and lascivious acts against seven young boys in the area. The 
defendants were convicted on all counts in a case involving essentially 
the same investigators and prosecutors as the Pitts case. 
Similar stories of a sex ring emerged after considerable prompting 
by local investigators and child services workers. The children all tes-
tified that adults performed sexual acts on them and that these acts 
were photographed.197 However, the children did not agree on exactly 
what was done or who took the photographs.198 As two lead investiga-
tors, one from the Sheriffs Department and the other from Child Pro-
tective Services, met with the children several times over a ten-day 
189. [d. at 775. 
190. [d. at 772. 
191. [d. 
192. [d. at 806-07. 
193. [d. at 809-18. 
194. [d. at 829-30. 
195. [d. at 860-61. 
196. 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989). 
197. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Cal. 1989). 
198. Stoll, 783 P.2d at 701-02. 
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period, allegations and depictions of events began to change.199 Dur-
ing these interviews the children were first informed that other chil-
dren had made allegations of abuse, and then they were asked to 
describe their own abuse.20o Such leading and suggestive interview 
techniques were used throughout the entire investigation. 
Similar to the investigation in the Pitts case, no photographs of 
the alleged sexual acts were found. In addition, no medical examina-
tions were performed on the child accusers and the interviews with 
the children were not recorded.201 As one article noted, "[E]ven if you 
believe[d] that someone did molest one or more of the boys, much of 
the kids' testimony pushed the bounds of plausibility-and of anat-
omy."202 Still, all four defendants were convicted on the respective 
counts and received varying sentences of 40, 31, 16, and 14 years in 
prison depending on their alleged involvement in the crimes. 203 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of California overturned two of the 
four convictions after reviewing the investigation and prosecution of 
the case. The conviction of one of the defendants, John Stoll, was not 
overturned until years later, after he had spent fifteen years in 
prison.204 The remaining defendant completed his sentence and was 
moved to a state mental hospital after the court determined that he 
was a sexually violent predator.205 
Many of the child accusers, now adults, say the abuse they so viv-
idly described years ago never happened.206 The accusers claim they 
"felt pressured by the investigators to describe sex acts. "207 One of the 
accusers, Ed Sampley, said that when he was initially confronted with 
questions about sex acts and molestation that Stoll allegedly commit-
ted, he vehemently denied it.20B But after repeated interviews with 
suggestive questioning, "at some point-Sampley doesn't remember 
when or exactly why-he changed his story."209 When the boys at-
tempted to recant their accusations soon after the trial, their parents 
were told that they were "in denial" or "too embarrassed to tell ... the 
truth. "210 
199. ld. at 702-03. 
200. ld. 
201. ld. at 703. 
202. Jones, supra note 57. 
203. Stoll, 783 P.2d at 707 n.15. 
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Years later, in 2004, many of the accusers came from miles away 
to officially recant their stories at Stoll's hearing.211 The judge ulti-
mately overturned Stoll's conviction, finding that "the children had 
been improperly interviewed, making their testimony unreliable."212 
In 1983 in Manhattan Beach, California, accusations of child 
abuse arose against the owners and aides of the McMartin Pre-
school.213 Peggy McMartin Buckley and her mother, Virginia McMar-
tin owned the preschool.214 Ray Buckey, Peggy's son, worked as a 
school aide at McMartin Preschool.215 In August of 1983, Judy John-
son called the Manhattan Beach police to report that Ray Buckey 
abused her two-and-a-half-year-old son.216 Although there was no 
physical evidence of abuse, police proceeded to investigate the 
accusations.217 
In early September of 1983, the Chief of Police sent a letter to 200 
parents of children who were attending or had attended McMartin 
Preschool at some point in the past.218 The letter indicated that Ray 
Buckey was under investigation for criminal acts of child molesta-
tion.219 The letter requested that parents ask their children whether 
they had been a witness to or a victim of any relevant crime. Specifi-
cally, the letter directed the parents to ask whether their children had 
ever witnessed Ray Buckey leave the room with a child during nap-
time or if they had ever seen him tie up a child.220 The Chief of Police 
indicated in his letter that "possible criminal acts include: oral sex, 
fondling of genitals, buttocks or chest area, and sodomy, possibly com-
mitted under the pretense of 'taking the child's temperature.'"221 This 
211. [d. 
[d. 
Perhaps more attention should have been paid to how the children became vic-
tims of the tactics employed by over-zealous investigators. This victimization 
was so severe in some cases that it lasted well into their adulthood. The adult 
Ed Sampley, for example, reported how the pressure tactics used by the inves-
tigators still distorted his sense of trust. Then 28, Sampley told how he is afraid 
to be around his stepdaughter's friends or to give his own 3-year-old daughter a 
bath lest someone accuse him of molesting them. 
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letter "set off a panic and, some lawyers have said, tainted the case 
from the outset."222 A local television station soon picked up on the 
story and reported that the McMartin Preschool may be linked to por-
nography rings and sex industries.223 
Hundreds of parents came forward to have their children inter-
viewed by representatives of the Children's Institute Internationa1.224 
Many of the children initially denied being molested, but ultimately 
360 interviewed children claimed they had been abused.225 Taped in-
terviews of the children later indicated that they were fed suggestive 
questions, urged to admit to the abuse, and rewarded for saying they 
had been sexually abused.226 One hundred and fifty children under-
went medical examinations. Although there were no physical signs of 
abuse that typically accompany sexually abused children, the doctor 
claimed to have performed new tests which indicated that approxi-
mately 120 children had been abused.227 These tests were later found 
to be an inaccurate indicator of abuse.228 
Tales of abuse by the children included satanic conspiracy, animal 
sacrifice, ritualistic murder of infants, acting in pornographic movies, 
flying witches, and secret underground tunnels.229 Despite the incre-
dulity of these stories, Ray Buckey, Peggy McMartin Buckey, Virginia 
McMartin, and several other individuals associated with the school 
were indicted on 115 counts of child abuse in 1984.230 The charges 
were later increased to 321 counts involving forty-eight children.231 
Ultimately, the prosecution charged only Ray Buckey' and Peggy Mc-
Martin Buckey and dismissed charges against the other indicted 
individuals.232 
In 1990, after years of investigation and trial, the jury handed 
down its verdict.233 Peggy McMartin Buckey was found not guilty on 
all counts and Ray Buckey was found not guilty on thirty-nine of fifty-
two counts, with a hung jury on the remaining thirteen counts against 
222. Robert Reinhold, The Longest Trial-A Post-Mortem; Collapse of Child-Abuse 
Case: So Much Agony for So Little, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1990/01l241us!longest-trial-post-mortem-collapse-child-abuse-case-so-much-agony-for-
so-little.html?scp=l&sq=&st=nyt. 
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him.234 By this time, Ray Buckey had spent five years in jaiI.235 
Later that same year, after a re-trial on the remaining thirteen 
counts, a different jury also remained hung.236 
Similar to the aftermath of the other child abuse cases discussed 
above, some of the child accusers in this case later recanted their sto-
ries. Kyle Zirpolo, a child who attended McMartin Preschool from 
1979-1980 when he was eight years old, had told stories of sex games, 
animal sacrifice, and child pornography in interviews with investiga-
tors and in his testimony in front of the Grand Jury.237 Zirpolo later 
recanted, claiming no one at McMartin Preschool "did anything to me, 
and I never saw them do anything."238 Zirpolo stated that interview-
ers would ask the same questions until they got the answer they 
wanted.239 He claimed that "there were so many kids saying all these 
things happened that you didn't want to be the one who said nothing. 
You wouldn't be believed if you said that."240 
In 1984 in Jordan, Minnesota, James Rud was arrested on allega-
tions of child abuse.241 During the police investigation of the alleged 
abuse, additional allegations of abuse and murder arose within the 
small community.242 Eventually the State charged twenty-four adults 
with molesting thirty-seven children.243 Of these twenty-four adults, 
one pled guilty, two were acquitted at trial, and charges were dropped 
against the remaining twenty-one defendants.244 The Scott County 
Attorney claimed that "the charges were dismissed in order to shield 
the children from the trauma of trial and to prevent the disclosure of 
evidence relating to an ongoing murder investigation."245 
Following dismissal of the charges by the Scott County Attorney 
against twenty-one of the defendants, the Attorney General, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, and the State Bureau of Criminal Appre-
234. Id. 
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hension performed an investigation into the allegations of murder and 
abuse.246 The Attorney General's Report ultimately concluded that 
there was "no credible evidence to support allegations of murder, 
which arose during the sexual abuse investigation" and there was "in-
sufficient evidence to justify the filling of any new sex abuse 
charges."247 It went on to detail the inherent flaws in the investiga-
tion and prosecution that tainted the proceedings from the start. Ulti-
mately, "any evidence, or testimony, that may have existed was ruined 
by the investigation."248 
The Report indicated that "allegations of child abuse ranging from 
gross sexual abuse to murder arose in Jordan, Minnesota."249 When 
the allegations arose, many of the "children were removed from their 
homes and isolated from" their families for long periods of time, even 
if they denied being sexually abused.250 When children were told that 
they could return home if they revealed that they had been abused, 
many confessed to being abused.251 However, their stories were in-
credible and inconsistent. In his initial interview, a child described 
three murders in graphic detaiI.252 In a subsequent interview, the 
same child described "seven children being stabbed, mutilated, and/or 
shot."253 Later, he claimed that five bodies had been dumped in a 
Minnesota River.254 Ultimately, the child admitted that he had lied 
about the murders.255 
Other children similarly admitted to fabricating stories. One 
child claimed that he made up detailed stories of sexual abuse because 
he told the interviewers what they wanted to hear.256 Another child 
admitted that "he got the idea of ritualistic torture from a television" 
show and that "he lied about the murders because he wanted to please 
the investigators."257 Yet another child stated that she made up sto-
ries about people being killed because her friend asked her to do SO.258 
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Many of the children were questioned multiple times at length, 
but records of the interviews were rarely made. For example, the po-
lice interviewed one nine-year-old girl approximately twenty times 
during the investigation, but only four written reports of the inter-
views were found. 259 Some of the children were interviewed together, 
and others were told what other child accusers had recounted.260 In 
one interview, "a child was told that his sibling had made allegations 
against a parent. He was then asked to describe what had happened 
to him."261 
The investigation was also characterized by the lack of corroborat-
ing physical and demonstrative evidence recovered. Despite allega-
tions of child pornography, police never recovered any photographs.262 
There were also no physical signs of abuse on any of the children. 263 
Investigators nonetheless proceeded to arrest suspects on little more 
than the children's bare allegations.264 To compensate for a lack of 
evidence, the County Attorney sought to induce the various defend-
ants to provide information in exchange for plea bargains.265 When 
defendant James Rud was first arrested, he described an elaborate 
child sex ring in exchange for a reduced sentence.266 He later admit-
ted that he had completely fabricated this information to please inves-
tigators and receive a lighter sentence.267 
While Attorney General Hubert Humphrey expressed his concern 
over the problem of child abuse in Minnesota, he made the point that 
"[iJn the Scott County cases ... something clearly went awry."268 As 
Justice Scalia aptly noted in his dissent in Maryland v. Craig,269 
"There is no doubt that some sexual abuse took place in Jordan; but 
there is no reason to believe that it was as widespread as charged."270 
IV. FLAWS IN SOCIETY'S TREATMENT OF CHILD SEX ABUSE 
By examining the flaws that existed in the way child sex abuse 
was handled by police, prosecutors, legislators, and the media, the so-
cietal impact that results from a crime becoming hot can be seen quite 
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clearly. Additionally, such an examination can point the way to avoid-
ing similar problems in the future as crimes become hot. 
The child abuse hysteria of the 1980s was compounded by various 
flaws throughout the investigation and prosecution of child sexual 
abuse cases. These flaws included investigators' disregard of unbe-
lievable and inconsistent allegations from child accusers, interviewers' 
use of junk science or good science in a questionable manner, courts' 
submission to undue pressure from the public and the media, and 
over-prosecution. The combination of these flaws in varying degrees 
produced tragic results for both the child accusers and the wrongfully 
accused defendants. 
The problems with investigating child abuse allegations in the 
1980s began with the child accusers' tales of abuse. Prior to the 1980s, 
prosecutors were hesitant to take on cases involving allegations by 
young children because of a widespread belief that children would tell 
fantastical stories rather than relate factual accounts.271 However, 
the overwhelming response to allegations of child abuse during the 
height of the daycare scandals was best characterized as a "refusal to 
disbelieve," even in the face of the most outrageous stories.272 Many 
of the stories that the children told were either inherently unbeliev-
able or at least inconsistent enough to raise doubts in the 
investigation. 
In the McMartin Preschool case discussed above, panic ensued 
when parents received a letter from the police informing them of alle-
gations of child sexual abuse and urging them to discover whether 
their children had also been abused.273 Soon, stories emerged of sa-
tanic rituals, live animals being slaughtered, and infant child sacri-
fices.274 The alleged victims of the child abuse asserted that in 
addition to being molested at the preschool, they had also been mo-
lested at various public places, "including a market, a car wash, and a 
church."275 Some children claimed that they had been taken on 
planes and others insisted they had been forced to drink blood.276 An-
other child stated that Ray Buckey, one of the alleged abusers, had 
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taken him to a cemetery and forced him to dig up bodies.277 The same 
child also told stories of trap doors in the preschool with elaborate un-
derground tunnels where lions were housed.278 In a similar case in 
New Jersey, Kelly Michaels, a kindergarten teacher, was accused of 
licking peanut butter off [children's] genitals, playing a piano 
while naked, forc[ing] the children to drink urine and eat fe-
ces; assaulting them with silverware, a sword and Lego 
blocks; forcing them to play the "cat game" where they all got 
naked and licked each other; amputating children's penises; 
[and] putting a real car and tree on top of one of them.279 
Despite the outrageous nature of these allegations and a lack of sup-
porting medical evidence, Kelly Michaels was convicted of 115 counts 
of child abuse and sentenced to forty-seven years in prison.28o 
Although there was no corroborating evidence for the children's 
fantastical tales, interviewers were determined not to question the 
truth of their allegations, even though the stories were inherently un-
believable and inconsistent.281 Investigators began with the premise 
that children never lied about being sexually abused, and that if a 
child claimed to have been sexually abused, the job of the investiga-
tors was to verify that fact. 282 At that point, investigators often en-
couraged children to make sexual descriptions.283 Rather than 
seeking to clarify inconsistent and outrageous descriptions of sexual 
abuse through rational questioning, investigators specifically sought 
to confirm the allegations of abuse.284 In fact, investigators often ig-
nored statements that did not conform to their theory of abuse and 
instead focused on unsupported and often contradictory tales of abuse 
given by the children.285 
During the extensive interviewing process leading up to trial, 
many interviewers tainted children's stories and memories through 
the use of junk science, or alternatively, the use of good science in a 
questionable manner. The interviewers often employed leading and 
suggestive questions, were improperly trained, misinterpreted sup-
posed evidence of abuse, used anatomically correct dolls in suggestive 
manners, repeatedly interviewed child accusers, and questioned mul-
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tiple accusers at the same time. These flaws in the investigation pro-
cess led hundreds of children to raise allegations of abuse where none 
had in fact occurred. 
Research has shown that the specific techniques used by inter-
viewers when questioning children about sexual abuse can have a di-
rect impact on the child accuser's answers.286 When these techniques 
are flawed in some material way, the integrity of an interviewee's re-
sponse is compromised.287 The use of suggestive questioning, such as 
by coaching, bribes, and threats, makes it more likely that child inter-
viewees will recount tales of abuse, even if they were never actually 
abused.288 Thus, the flawed techniques of the interviewers coupled 
with the high suggestibility of children in general caused many false 
allegations of child sexual abuse.289 
The suggestive techniques used by interviewers involved leading 
questions to the children that suggested a particular answer.290 Chil-
dren, therefore, answered the questions based on their perception of 
the answer the interviewer wanted.291 The children were ultimately 
seeking approval from their adult interviewers in the answers they 
gave.292 At times, interviewers may not have been aware that their 
questions, simply by the way or how many times they were asked, sug-
gested the answer they sought.293 Even if unintended at times, these 
suggestive interview techniques led children to give responses that 
were then incorporated into the children's memories as truthful ac-
counts of sexual abuse.294 
The use of suggestive questions and other flawed techniques 
stemmed, at least in part, from a lack of skill on the part of the inter-
viewer in child abuse investigations. As subsequent research has 
shown, "[T]he skill of the interviewer directly influences whether a 
child relates a true memory, discusses a false belief, affirms details 
suggested by others, embellishes fantasies, or provides no information 
at all."295 Although many interviewers may have believed that their 
extensive educational and research backgrounds qualified them for in-
vestigating allegations of child sexual abuse, most investigators had a 
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limited understanding of both their objective and the criteria they 
should have been using to determine if sexual abuse occurred.296 
Even with the use of proper techniques, it is difficult to evaluate the 
reliability of a child's statements and to put those statements into a 
cohesive structure.297 
In addition to the difficulties presented in gathering statements 
and other evidence, another flaw in the investigation process occurred 
in the interpretation of that evidence. In determining the meaning of 
certain statements and behaviors, interviewers failed to be cognizant 
of the fact that there is no particular type of behavior or action that 
specifically indicates child sexual abuse.298 For example, in medical 
examinations conducted following allegations of sexual abuse, doctors 
have found many of the supposed indicators of abuse in not abused as 
well as abused children.299 Psychological evaluations similarly re-
sulted in the assessment of symptoms that were once thought to be 
indicative of anal and genital rape but which were later found to have 
interpretations wholly separate from sexual abuse.30o 
The anatomically correct doll was yet another flawed investiga-
tive tool widely used in interviewing suspected child abuse victims. 
Many investigators used anatomically correct dolls in the beginning 
stages of an interview with the expectation that children who were 
uncomfortable talking about sexual abuse would exhibit signs of 
abuse by playing with certain areas, such as the sexual organs or ori-
fices, of the doll.301 
However, this suggestive interviewing technique may lead to false 
allegations of sexual abuse.302 Many interviewers are not trained in 
how to properly use the dolls in an interview setting.303 Therefore, 
like the problems associated with interpreting medical evidence re-
lated to uncovering child sexual abuse, it is difficult to interpret the 
meaning of a child's behavior in playing with an anatomically correct 
doll. In addition to the fact that many children who were not abused 
may play with the dolls' sexual organs, interviewers ultimately tend to 
find indicators of sexual abuse in many circumstances.304 Lastly, 
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there is no uniform standard available for interviewers to determine 
what kind of sexualized play may indicate abuse.305 Thus, even those 
interviewers who have received some training in the correct usage of 
anatomically correct dolls may nevertheless come to different conclu-
sions about the meaning of a child's interaction with a doll.306 
Another flaw in the investigation process occurred when inter-
viewers questioned children on multiple, separate occasions and when 
interviewers introduced information from other child accusers during 
these interviews. Throughout the investigation process and continu-
ing until the time of trial, interviewers repeatedly questioned children 
on multiple occasions.307 In addition, many interviewers often re-
peated the same questions during an interview.30B This repetition be-
comes its own learning process and can change or create a memory.309 
The phenomena of creating a memory through repetitive questions is 
often irreversible, as the altered perceptions are reinforced with each 
subsequent interview.3lO AB interviewers conducted investigations of 
more and more children supposedly involved in the same incident, the 
interviewers became aware of common threads between the stories.311 
The interviewers may have focused their suggestive questions around 
these accounts so that "repeated reinforcement of these ideas created 
in the child a 'subjective reality' that an event did happen even if it 
never did. "312 
Similar dangers are present when an interviewer conducts an in-
terview of multiple potential child accusers at the same time. Inter-
viewers in these circumstances tend to assure the child interviewees 
during questioning that the abuser is a bad person and deserves to be 
punished.3l3 This suggestive technique often results in children alter-
ing their answers to be consistent with those of their peers.314 Other 
times in multi-victim cases, an interviewer will interview one child at 
a time but will tell the child that they have received allegations of 
abuse from other children.315 AB in the situation where multiple chil-
dren are interviewed together, a child is more likely to say that he or 
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she has been abused after receiving information that another child al-
ready admitted to being abused, regardless of the accuracy of the 
statement.316 
Media coverage of child abuse allegations and public pressure to 
prosecute the cases constituted yet another category of flaws in the 
investigation process. Because the media provides an important 
source of information to the public regarding crime and criminals not 
generally available elsewhere, it has a great deal of influence over the 
public's beliefs and attitudes about these subjects.317 When the media 
puts such great emphasis on a crime, it creates a sense of anxiety 
about the crime and about being the victim of the crime.318 The media 
focuses on the most atypical crimes and offenders, thus "rais[ing] the 
specter of the predatory criminal from a minor character to a common, 
ever present image."319 This image often leads to an outcry for justice 
by the public, which then forces prosecutors to act, regardless of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.32o 
As was the case during the child abuse hysteria of the 1980s, 
when the media inundates news stories with senseless acts of vio-
lence, society's instinctual reaction for dealing with the violence is to 
punish those who pose a threat.321 This perception was so strong dur-
ing the investigations and trials of suspected child sexual abuse in the 
1980s that it became impossible to believe that the defendants were 
innocent.322 Thus, those accused of child sexual abuse had been con-
victed by the media and the public before they ever stepped foot in a 
courtroom. 
Lastly, the concept of over-prosecution arose both during the tri-
als of those facing child abuse charges and later in statutes enacted by 
the legislature in response to infamous child sexual abuse tragedies 
that received media attention throughout the country. Prosecutorial 
misconduct was rampant in many of the child sexual abuse cases in 
the 1980s.323 Although faced with unbelievable and inconsistent ac-
counts of alleged abuse, prosecutors characterized the evidence as cor-
rect accounts in part because they were elicited by "skilled behavioral-
science investigators." These investigations were then used to obtain 
often "florid" indictments.324 
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Prosecutors were later criticized for failing to disclose to the de-
fense some of the most bizarre accusations of satanic rituals. A mis-
trial was declared in one case from St. Louis, Missouri, and a 
conviction was overturned in another case from Roseburg, Oregon for 
just this reason.325 When the California appellate court overturned 
the convictions of the falsely accused defendants in People v. Pitts,326 
the court scolded the prosecution for making improper assertions in 
closing argument, appealing to the emotions of the jury, personally 
attacking the defense counsel, and referring to facts that had not been 
admitted into evidence during closing arguments, on motions, or dur-
ing objections.327 
In addition to the prosecutors' unfair and unethical practices in 
the courtroom, state legislatures enacted harsh legislation around this 
time in response to actual and alleged child sexual abuse. During the 
height of child sexual abuse hysteria in the 1980s, state and federal 
legislatures drafted new laws designed to protect missing or abused 
children, create guidelines for registration of sex offenders, and guide 
investigations of day care centers. 
Today, all states require some form of sex offender registration.328 
This requirement stems in part from the federal government's threat 
to withdraw federal funding in states that do not require sex offenders 
to register and provide information.329 While such registration laws 
can be effective tools in combating re-offending by sexual predators, 
they can also overreach. Additionally, because each state can define 
the requirements for registration, there is divergence in the definition 
of what constitutes a dangerous sex offender.330 
While some states require only the most serious offenders to reg-
ister, other states require that all sex offenders, defined in various 
ways by state statute, register and provide information.33l Many of 
these states' registration laws have become over-inclusive in the of-
fenses for which they require registration. As a result, the laws con-
flict with the states' originally intended goal of protecting children 
from sexual abuse. For example, Alabama requires registration for 
those convicted of second-degree prostitution, even between con-
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senting adults.332 Many states, including Washington, California, In-
diana, and Colorado, require registration for crimes committed for the 
purpose of "sexual gratification."333 Lastly, some state courts have re-
quired registration for individuals charged with, but not convicted of, 
one of the many "sexual offenses" as defined in that state's statute.334 
These examples provide insight into how states have strayed from the 
originally intended purpose of the registration statutes in response to 
the media's portrayal of sensationalized and horrific crimes committed 
by repeat offenders. 
Community notification laws provide another related example of 
legislation that began in response to child sexual abuse crimes. De-
spite the intended purpose of these statutes, they have at times in-
cited vigilante attacks, making it difficult for offenders to live in the 
community.335 These notification laws require distribution of highly 
personal information about offenders to various groups and individu-
als in the community.33G States can use any method of prescribed 
communication to notify community members ofthe presence of a con-
victed sex offender, such as posting the information online or in a pub-
lic place in the community.337 Perhaps most disturbing is the fact 
that many states fail to provide registrants with a right to appeal 
their placement on the registry, the means of notification, and the 
length of registration.338 While this type of legislation was drafted 
and passed in response to tragic crimes that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s, the statutes in their current form no longer satisfy the original 
legislative intent to protect communities from truly dangerous 
criminals. 
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v. SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW WAY TO APPROACH HOT 
CRIMES 
75 
With an understanding both of what causes crimes to become hot 
and how this social phenomenon impacts the manner in which such 
crimes are handled or mishandled, we can now turn to suggestions for 
preventing crimes from becoming hot and coping with the excesses 
that result from them if they do. 
A. LEARN TO RECOGNIZE THE SYMPTOMS GIVEN OFF AS CRIMES ARE 
BECOMING HOT 
First, as a society, we need to recognize the existence of a hot 
crime consistent with how this Article has defined one.339 If society 
begins to look with an informed eye at such crimes, we can identifY 
those which are likely to result in excesses in the way they are per-
ceived, prosecuted, and legislated. Specifically, the following can all be 
signs that a crime is being hot: how these crimes have been misunder-
stood and treated historically, the presence of an especially heinous or 
disastrous triggering criminal act or series of acts, the existence of 
calls for extreme and unusual reactions from the public and the me-
dia, and responses from the courts and legislatures that are different 
in kind or degree from how other crimes are treated. The ability to 
recognize that a particular crime possesses elements that may lead to 
excessive reactions will allow all aspects of society to act preemptively 
at the early signs that such excesses are taking place. 
As this Article has discussed, crimes related to driving while in-
toxicated had been traditionally regarded as minor by the public and 
treated with undue leniency by the courts.340 In part this was due to 
the "there but for fortune go I" attitude about driving intoxicated. 
When the public, with the assistance of groups such as Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), began to understand the dangers 
that drunk drivers created and began to see the leniency with which 
the courts punished such drivers, the reaction was a strong one.341 In 
time, what was an appropriately strong reaction became an inappro-
priately excessive one.342 
Crimes related to the sexual abuse of children were never taken 
lightly, however, most people had little understanding of how often 
they happened and even less understanding of how most child molest-
ers were not the proverbial stranger in the long coat but instead a 
339. See supra Part II. 
340. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
342. See supra Part 1I1.A. 
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friend, acquaintance, or member of the family.343 Due to these misun-
derstandings and the inclination of many people to regard even dis-
cussing such things as taboo, child molestation crimes were 
dramatically underreported.344 In this historical under appreciation 
of the seriousness or prevalence of a crime, we can see the seeds for 
potential over-reaction once the various elements of society come to 
recognize the problem in its full form. 
Be it a spectacular arson fire at a Bronx social club, a series of 
intensely reported and hyped up child sex abuse cases at daycare cen-
ters, or the calamitous events of 9/11, there is a real danger that such 
tragic events could lead to societal over-reactions. The angrier people 
are at criminal behavior, the more likely they will respond to it.345 
This is a good thing when it results in correcting the misunderstand-
ings that led to such crimes being ignored or treated too leniently, but 
not such a good thing when it casts suspicions on people merely be-
cause of who they are or what job they perform.346 It is also not such a 
good thing when it results in unnecessary and improperly suggestive 
law enforcement procedures or draconian sentences that previously 
were reserved for more serious crimes.347 
Burning down an empty warehouse is a serious crime. Should it 
suddenly be treated more seriously than forcible rape or manslaugh-
ter? Has not society crossed the line in protecting children from abus-
ers when day care providers are afraid to hug children in their care for 
fear that someone will see them and claim they touched the children 
improperly? Is even the most heinous act ever an excuse for the stere-
otyping of people based on their religion or appearance? 
Major crimes need to be treated with the harshness warranted by 
the deed, and where needed, laws should be drafted to make such 
crimes more difficult to commit or to punish the lawbreaker propor-
tionally to the seriousness of the crime. Yet we need to take special 
care in such circumstances not to allow the crime of the moment to 
rise to such a level that it silences the debate that normally accompa-
nies the search to discover the best means of responding to crimes in 
an effective yet measured way. 
We need next to look at how the public is reacting to these crimes. 
Is the media fueling public anger?348 Are organizations becoming 
more and more strident and uncompromising in their attempts to 
343. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
345. See generally supra Parts I, II. 
346. See supra Part III.B. 
347. See supra Part III.A. 
348. See supra notes 106, 226, 321-27 and accompanying text. 
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shed light on and combat the crimes?349 We must react to serious 
crimes in meaningful and substantive ways, but there is no crime that 
warrants the destruction of prized values such as fairness or constitu-
tional principles involving the presumption of innocence, due process, 
and the notion that a punishment should fit the crime. 
Are draconian laws being passed, which not only cause unfair 
sentences but which ironically make law enforcement less effec-
tive?350 When the seriousness of the drug problem and its relation-
ship to other crimes was fully appreciated, tough laws were passed to 
address drug related crimes. Some went too far, such as a New York 
law that permitted the court to sentence a first offender who passed a 
marijuana cigarette to another person to life imprisonment.351 This 
not only created a grossly unfair sentence scheme but also led the po-
lice, courts, and prosecutors to take steps to avoid enforcing the law as 
written.352 When courts are treating teenage boys past the age ofma-
jority who had sex with teenage girls like forcible rapists by sentenc-
ing them to substantial terms of imprisonment,353 it is clear that 
courts have disregarded the important and sensible line drawing that 
is designed to treat crimes proportionally to the extent of the moral 
wrong and the degree of harm caused. Additionally, punishing some-
one convicted only of statutory rape like a forcible rapist devalues the 
seriousness of a crime such as forcible rape.354 
349. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra Part III. 
351. See Judy Mann, Getting Wise to Stupid Drug Laws, WASH. POST, at C-9 (Mar. 
30, 2001) (discussing the flaws in "New York's draconian Rockefeller drug laws, which 
mandate[dl a 15-year-to-life sentence" for possessing or selling small amounts ofnarcot-
ics, even for first time offenders). 
352. See Austin Fenner, Prosecutors RIP Plan to Ease Drug Laws: Stiff Terms Nee· 
essary, They Say, N.Y. DAlLY NEWS (Feb. 11, 2001). See generally Nancy S. Marder, 
Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 337, 360-62 (2002). 
353. See, e.g., Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J. L. & POL'y 717,717 
(2008). Genarlow Wilson, a seventeen-year old with no prior criminal record, was con-
victed of aggravated child molestation and sentenced to a mandatory term of ten years 
in prison without the possibility of parole when a fifteen-year-old girl consensually per-
formed oral sex on him during a party. Id. at 717-18. 
354. See Jessie K Liu, Victimhood, 71 Mo. L. REV. 115, 127-28 (2006) (arguing that 
sentences should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime committed). The Su-
preme Court recognized the importance of not sentencing even especially heinous 
criminals such as child rapists to a sentence that is disproportional to the crime commit-
ted. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). While Kennedy was a death-pen-
alty case and the Court's approach to just how disproportional a non-capital sentence 
has to be to violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment 
is somewhat murky, see, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263 (1980), there should be no doubt that a sentence grossly disproportional to the 
crime committed is unfair whether or not that unfairness rises to the level of a constitu-
tional violation. 
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B. CHALLENGE THE MEDIA AND OTHERS To AVOID OVER-
SENSATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM 
[Vol. 45 
It is no secret that numerous elements of the media thrive on sen-
sationalizing crimes.355 In a country that values freedom of the press, 
that cannot be prevented. If not challenged, newspaper stories, In-
ternet communications, and television segments serve to feed the fires 
of over-reaction. Mechanisms must be put into place that quickly re-
spond to these stories and that acknowledge the seriousness of the 
crimes, but that also warn of the dangers of over-reaction and call into 
question some of the outrageous claims that tend to accompany hot 
crimes. Allegations, especially ones that seem too wild to be true, 
often are untrue or at least highly exaggerated.356 Common sense 
should have told people immediately that some of the wild claims of 
children abetted by therapists and law enforcement personnel in the 
1980S357 were absurd, but the hysteria over child abuse drowned out 
common sense. 
There should be people writing op-ed pieces in newspapers, offer-
ing themselves as guests on television shows, responding in blogs and 
on websites to some of the more outrageous claims made or at the 
least insisting upon some verification for these claims. The message 
sent should be that warning about excessive reactions to crimes does 
not make the one who issues the warning weak or insensitive to the 
damage done by the crime. 
C. CRAFT LAws RESPONSIVE TO THE CRIMES BUT THAT Do NOT 
OVERREACH 
There are times when, because the seriousness or prevalence of 
certain crimes is underappreciated, laws need to be changed to re-
spond to new information learned about such crimes. Science showed 
that people posed a danger to other drivers and pedestrians when the 
alcohol content of their blood was lower than had previously been be-
lieved.358 Therefore lowering the blood alcohol level required to be 
guilty of alcohol-related driving crimes to a level consistent with these 
scientific findings made sense. Some states allow for punishing those 
convicted of drunk driving by requiring ignition locks on their cars-
meaning that before the drivers can start their cars, they must blow 
355. Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1317, 1384 (1998). 
356. See supra Part III.B. 
357. See generally Parts III.B, IV. 
358. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. 
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into a machine that tests the alcohol content of their blood.359 A read-
ing above a certain amount will make the car impossible to start.360 
While laws such as these have their critics and can be excessive, 
they do have one important feature that is important in avoiding cer-
tain over-reactions to hot crimes. Laws such as these target only indi-
viduals who have been found guilty of a crime or those whose conduct 
is reasonably believed to be in violation of the law. Such a feature also 
can contribute to the reasonableness and effectiveness oflaw enforce-
ment approaches. For example, the practice employed by law enforce-
ment personnel trained to observe the signs of drunk driving from 
their cars while parked on the sides of roads has proven to be both an 
effective and reasonable method of apprehending drunk drivers.361 
Sobriety checkpoints, on the other hand, have no such limitation 
as they stop everyone, making no distinction for who mayor may not 
be violating the law.362 These stops, which are seizures and fall 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment, are made without 
any suspicion that the person stopped may be intoxicated.363 There 
are certain Fourth Amendment searches and seizures that are accept-
able without individualized suspicion because the appropriate govern-
mental objectives can be achieved in no other reasonable way.364 This 
Article has argued that drunk driving laws can be enforced in other 
equally, if not more, effective ways.365 The normal ways of analyzing 
the effectiveness of a governmental search or seizure done without the 
existence of individualized suspicion (a necessary arialysis in deter-
mining the constitutionality of such Fourth Amendment implicated 
activity) were largely abandoned by many courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of these check-
points.366 There is good reason to believe this abandonment occurred 
because drunk driving had become a hot crime. 
359. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ignition Inter-
locks Reduce Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Feb. 22,2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
media/releasesl20111p0222_ignitioninterlocks.html. 
360. [d. 
361. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
362. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra notes 74·76 and accompanying text. 
364. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 647·48 (1995) (drug 
testing of school athletes); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-
68 (1989) (drug testing of customs service employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624, 631 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 1>43, 560-62 (1976) (border area inspections); 
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. ofS.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (municipal housing 
inspections). 
365. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 359 
(study demonstrating effectiveness of interlock device); supra notes 107-42 and accom-
panying text. 
366. See supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text. 
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As new laws are proposed, care should be taken not to create se-
verely longer sentences or criminalize behavior that was not previ-
ously considered criminal unless the existing laws contain significant 
omissions or undervalue the seriousness of crime. The approach taken 
by the New York State Legislature to the drug problem in the 1970s, 
often referred to as the Rockefeller drug laws and discussed above,367 
offers a concrete example of sentences made far too severe in reaction 
to hot crimes. 
Additionally, the laws or at least the application of them should 
maintain meaningful distinctions between those offenders who de-
serve serious penalties and those who do not. While statutory rape 
can be a crime deserving of substantial jail time in certain situations, 
the push for tougher sentences for child sex abusers should riot lead to 
ten-year prison sentences for consensual sex between teenagers368 or 
provide a justification for placing such teens on a sex offender registry 
list for the rest of their lives.369 
As new laws are created and existing laws are updated to reflect 
the prevalence or seriousness of crimes that previously did not receive 
the attention they deserved, we must be cognizant of the possible col-
lateral consequences of such changes in laws. In crafting the laws, 
lawmakers must be vigilant in guarding against allowing these laws 
to apply to innocent people or allowing innocent activity to be 
criminalized. Similarly, in their zeal to apprehend and prosecute 
those who commit hot crimes, police and prosecutors must not aban-
don the checks and balances they normally apply before bringing 
charges against criminal offenders. Of special concern is allowing 
public pressure to coax police into using investigation and enforce-
ment techniques that may not be scientifically or empirically defensi-
ble.370 For prosecutors, the dangers lie in overlooking evidence that 
may raise doubts about the guilt of an accused offender and in not 
sufficiently assessing the credibility of both lay and expert 
witnesses.371 
367. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text. 
368. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the 
appellant's conviction for aggravated child molestation and mandatory lO-year impris-
onment sentence). 
369. See, e.g., People ex ret. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 2009); In re 
J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (TIl. 2003); In re T.C., 894 N.E.2d 876 (ill. App. Ct. 2008); In re 
Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re D.P., No. 2008-L-186, 
2009 WL 4021187 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009); In re Marcio A., No. 2007 CA 00149, 
2008 WL 4118249 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2008). 
370. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra notes 275-77, 325-31 and accompanying text. 
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The existing data demonstrates that although sobriety check-
points are ineffective in dealing with drunk driving,372 states continue 
to use them. The seizures at these checkpoints, which are permitted 
despite the absence of individualized suspicion, raise serious constitu-
tional concerns and clearly should not pass the U.S. Supreme Court's 
own tests for Fourth Amendment legality.373 The investigations that 
led to the prosecutions of day care facility workers for child sex abuse 
relied on stories of children, which were often so bizarre that they 
should have raised immediate red flags with police and prosecu-
tors.374 These stories were supported by the testimony of child ther-
apists whose suggestive methods in getting the stories from the 
children were highly questionable and have now been largely 
discredited.375 
D. USE LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM TO MODERATE EXCESSES OF 
UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
There are primarily four justifications for punishment, and 
sentences in criminal cases invariably are based on one or more of 
these justifications. The four justifications are retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Retribution is a morality based 
concept which focuses on justice based principles.376 The other three 
justifications are utilitarian in nature, each seeking to reduce the like-
lihood that crimes will be committed in the future.377 Through under-
standing these justifications for punishment and applying them 
wisely, society can structure criminal penalties to avoid the excessive 
sentences associated with hot crimes. To understand how this may be 
accomplished, it is necessary to first understand the nature and pur-
pose of each of the justifications for punishment. 
Retribution seeks to salve the wound caused to society by the com-
mission of a crime.378 The way to salve this wound according to re-
tributionists is to provide a punishment commensurate with the 
372. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text. 
374. See supra Part III.B. 
375. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text. 
376. See generally HL.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 236 (1968); HER-
BERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9-10 (1968). 
377. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 151 (1979); PACKER, 
supra note 376, at 10-11 (1968); LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME - A STUDY OF 
CRIME IN ITS SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 115 (1966). 
378. The goal of punishment to the retributionist must be some form of righting the 
wrong and not "the serpent wings of utilitarianism." C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PuN-
ISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 159 (1987); NIGEL P. WALKER, WHY PuNISH? 7 
(1991). 
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seriousness of the crime committed.379 Retributionists normally mea-
sure the seriousness of the crime by assessing the blameworthiness of 
the wrongdoer and the degree of harm the crime caused.380 The focus 
of a retributionist sentence is the creation of a reasonably proportional 
relationship between the seriousness of the crime and the harshness 
of the sentence. The goals of most retributionists are limited to fair-
ness and justice, without a strong concern for whether the sentence 
will reduce crime in the future.381 To many retributionists, it is wrong 
to use a person, even one guilty of a crime, to achieve societal goals, 
especially if those goals compromise fairness.382 
There are two forms of deterrence: general deterrence and special 
or specific deterrence.383 Deterrence based sentences are designed to 
make the punishment harsh enough that those contemplating com-
mitting a similar crime in the future will get the message that the 
benefit the potential wrongdoer hopes to gain through the crime is 
outweighed by the punishment he will suffer if caught and con-
victed.384 General deterrence is designed to use the sentence in a 
given case to send the message to the public at large,385 while specific 
or special deterrence aims the message at the defendant.386 In each 
case, the focus is not on creating a sentence that is fair because it is 
proportional to the crime committed but the focus is on reducing fu-
ture crime.387 The justification is utilitarian in nature.388 
The purpose of sentences with the primary justification of inca-
pacitation is to insure that the individual who committed the crime is 
379. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR fuTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGER-
OUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985). 
380. [d. at 64; Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment 
Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From 
Precedent to Precedent," 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 69 (1985). 
381. See, e.g., C.S. LEWIS, THE HUMANITARIAN THEORY OF PuNISHMENT, reprinted in 
CONTEMPORARY PuNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 194 (Rudolph 
J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) ("[T]he concept of desert is the only con-
necting link between punishment and justice."). 
382. Immanuel Kant believed that "one man ought never to be dealt with as a 
means subservient to the purpose of another." IMMANUEL KANT, JUSTICE AND Punish-
ment, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF PuNISHMENT 103, 104 (Gertrude 
Ezorsky ed., 1972); see also LEWIS, supra note 381, at 195. 
383. NICHOLAS N. Kl'ITRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND COR-
RECTIONS: LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 12 (1981); PACKER, supra note 376, at 39. 
384. PACKER, supra note 376, at 140; RAnZINowICZ, supra note 377, at 10-11; VON 
HIRSCH, supra note 379, at 32. 
385. KrTTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 12; PACKER, supra note 376, at 39; see 
also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing Jeremy 
Bentham's espousal of general deterrence). 
386. PACKER, supra note 376, at 45. 
387. [d. at II. 
388. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PuNISHMENTS 45 (1976); 
see TEN, supra note 378, at 7-8. 
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separated from the public so he will no longer pose a danger.389 Inca-
pacitation based sentences are generally reserved for the most hei-
nous of criminals like serial murderers or child rapists. The goal of 
such a sentence is to separate the dangerous individual from his po-
tential victims.390 While this often means that the most serious 
crimes are punished most severely, as in a retribution based sentence, 
this is not the goal of the incapacitationist. Therefore, a defendant can 
be punished more harshly than the crime he committed might call for 
because he is deemed to pose a danger to society due to the perceived 
likelihood that he will commit similar acts in the future.391 With its 
eye on preventing the criminal from endangering others in the future, 
incapacitation is also a utilitarian sentence justification. 
Rehabilitation as a sentencing justification is not to be confused 
with the programs both within and outside penal institutions that are 
designed to help an offender overcome whatever problem led him to 
criminal behavior. Programs that provide counseling, education, or vo-
cational training designed to aid the offender in leading a crime-free 
life in the future may be the tools employed for a rehabilitation based 
sentence. As a sentencing justification, however, rehabilitation refers 
to crafting a sentence, including the length of any incarceration, condi-
tioned on how long it will take the offender to free himself from 
whatever led him to commit crimes.392 In crafting such a sentence, the 
importance of the seriousness of the crime is minimal in comparison to 
an assessment of what and how much time the offender will need to 
change sufficiently so that he will not re-offend.393 Rehabilitation, 
with its focus on changing the offender rather than making the sen-
tence proportional to the crime, is another utilitarian sentencing 
justification. 
Understandably, judges often wish to accomplish something they 
regard as meaningful when sentencing criminals. At times, the pri-
mary purpose of a sentence is to help the offender deal with the per-
ceived problem that led him to commit the criminal act. Sometimes, 
the sentencing judge wishes to separate the dangerous offender from 
the rest of society. At other times, it is clear that the judge's goal is 
use the sentence to send a message either to the defendant or poten-
389. TEN, supra note 378, at 8. 
390. KI'l'TRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 13. 
391. VON HIRSCH, supra note 379, at 24; see also KI'ITRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, 
at 24. 
392. KI'l'TRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 11, 23. 
393. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the 
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problems of Hate 
Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 42 & n.239 (1994). 
84 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
tial future offenders about the price they will pay for committing a 
similar crime. All of these utilitarian goals are laudable. 
The more a sentence reflects utilitarian principles, however, the 
more likely it is to skew the proportionality of the relationship be-
tween the seriousness of the crime and the harshness of the punish-
ment.394 Retributionists believe that sentencing defendants to more 
or less time than they "deserve" (meaning the seriousness of the crime 
they committed) is unjust.395 Due to the attention hot crimes get from 
the public and politicians, it would be na'ive to expect judges to ignore 
the pressure that builds on them in sentencing defendants who have 
been convicted of hot crimes. The press and watchdog groups often 
make the public aware of sentences in such cases. In most instances, 
the pressure in such cases is to sentence those convicted of hot crimes 
to heavy sentences. Therefore, with hot crimes the temptation to base 
a sentence primarily on utilitarian principles and impose a heavier 
sentence than one that fits the particular crime committed is likely to 
be especially intense. AI:, a result, harsh sentences may be meted out 
for such crimes to first offenders or in situations where the facts or 
circumstances mitigate the seriousness of the offense. 
As judges will often use utilitarian principles in sentencing de-
fendants for hot crimes and, as the use of such principles may be ap-
propriate, it would be unwise as well as ineffective to attempt to 
eliminate such sentencing. On the other hand, because the use of 
these principles can result in sentences that may be totally dispropor-
tionate to the seriousness of the crime committed, they can result in 
gross unfairness. The solution to this problem is to employ the princi-
ples of limiting retributivism. 
Limiting retributivism allows judges to include whatever utilita-
rian goal they deem appropriate in determining the proper sentence 
394. In the acerbic words of C.8. Lewis, 
Only the expert penologist . . . in the light of previous experiment, can tell is 
what is likely to deter: only the psychotherapist can tell us what is likely to 
cure. It will be in vain for the rest of us, speaking simply as men, to say, 'but 
this punishment is hideously unjust, hideously disproportionate to the crimi-
nal's deserts. The experts with perfect logic will reply "but nobody was talking 
about deserts." No one was talking about punishment in your archaic vindic-
tive sense of the word. Here are the statistics proving the treatment deters. 
Here are the statistics proving that this other treatment cures. What is your 
trouble? 
C.S. LEWIS, supra note 381, at 196. SEE ALSO WALKER, supra note 275, at 67. 
395. Herbert Morris suggests that the wrongfulness of basing punishment on 
achieving utilitarian ends is apparent when looking at a person who would be sentenced 
despite being innocent of any crime. Even if deterrence or some other utilitarian goal 
were achieved through the sentence, it would still be unjust. HERBERT MORRIS, PERSONS 
AND PuNISHMENT, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PuNISHMENT, supra 
note 382, at 121. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 
(1972); MURPHY, supra note 377, at 234. 
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for a criminal offender. At the end of the day, though, the judge must 
review the sentence to decide if the use of utilitarian factors has so 
skewed the relationship between the crime and the punishment that 
the resulting sentence is grossly unfair.396 Norval Morris, a strong be-
liever in making sentences proportional to crimes, wrote that just de-
sert is not a defining principle but a limiting one.397 Another 
commentator described the benefit of limiting retributivism stating, 
"[C]onsiderations of justice function as checks on social utility, weigh-
ing against promoting happiness if in so doing people are treated 
unfairly. "398 
When dealing with hot crimes, the primary dangers of which are 
excesses in many forms, use of the principle of limiting retributivism 
would be especially valuable. Limiting retributivism would allow a 
judge to consider the importance of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and! 
or deterrence in his or her sentence while protecting against the kind 
of unjust sentences that lose sight ofthe relationship between the seri-
ousness of the crime itself and the harshness of the punishment.399 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the phenomenon of the hot crime. Primarily 
using child sex abuse and alcohol related driving offenses as exam-
ples, this Article traced the path and trajectory of such crimes. Only 
by understanding what causes certain crimes to become hot, the kinds 
of excessive responses that hot crimes provoke, and the resulting soci-
etal impact from these responses, can we hope to avoid these types of 
over-reaction. As societal responses to hot crimes reflect somewhat 
natural human behavior, there is no foolproof way to prevent the 
harmful excesses that hot crimes can produce. There are, however, 
steps that can be taken to reduce the possibility of a crime becoming 
hot and to diminish the harmful effects should the crime take on such 
characteristics. 
First, we need to recognize the symptoms that are indicative of a 
crime becoming hot. There needs to be effective mechanisms in exis-
tence for challenging the media and the public who exaggerate the 
dangers or prevalence of certain crimes or call for extreme responses 
396. WALKER, supra note 275, at 127. While H.L. Packer believes that prevention or 
deterrence is the chief goal of the criminal law, he recognizes that blameworthiness 
(retribution) must act as a limiting principle. PACKER, supra note 376, at 66. 
397. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982). 
398. MuRPHY, supra note 377, at 150. 
399. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court wrote in a recent case, "Even 
if the punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that 
the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification offered." Gra-
ham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010). 
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to them. Public officials may need to change old laws or craft new 
ones to respond adequately to what is newly learned about certain 
crimes, but those laws should not overreach or have deleterious collat-
eral consequences. Courts should not abandon traditional approaches 
to the interpretation of constitutional rights when dealing with such 
crimes. Finally, when sentencing persons convicted of crimes, espe-
cially hot crimes, judges should employ the principles of limiting re-
tributivism to insure that the relationship between crime and 
punishment is not grossly disproportional. 
